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THE CRESSET

In Luce Tua

By DON A. AFFELDT

Comment on Current Issues

A Separate Peace
A "People's Peace Treaty" has lately begun circulating in the country. The treaty is a document which individuals and groups are signing in order to express
their desire for an end to hostilities in Southeast Asia.
The treaty is sponsored by a number of student groups
in the United States, South Vietnam, and North Vietnam. The intent of these groups is to urge, or to force,
the leaders of those countries to respond to their constituents' apparently overwhelming preference for a
rapid end to the Vietnam war. A declaration of peace
among men of good will, it is thought, will hasten a public declaration of peace by politicians.
This novel strategem is immensely interesting.
Whether or not it succeeds in its goal, the very idea of a
People's Peace Treaty suggests an important shift in
democratic theory. Far from being simply a new ploy in
the anti-war organizations' resurgent campaign, the
treaty signals a major extension in the theory of Participatory Democracy.
The rhetoric of Participatory Democracy has had
largely to do with increasing the involvement of citizens
in the administration of governmental programs which
most directly affect them. Though even Mr. Nixon has
spoken rather grandly about returning some "power to
the people," it would seem that the power he speaks of
is less the power to determine national policy than it is
power to help implement national policy. No significant
structural changes in governmental operations have, to
my knowledge, been contemplated, nor have any very
sweeping changes been demanded, except, of course, by
self-styled revolutionary groups. Yet the People's Peace
Treaty certainly suggests some radical alterations in the
political power structure. It appears to be the last word
in Participatory Democracy : it implies that the people
themselves should rule, even (or especially) in matters
of war and peace.
So far as I can tell , democracy in this country has
never involved rule by the people. It involves governApril, 1971

ment of everyone by some of us for the general good,
authorized by a majority of voting citizens - to which
majoritarian plan we all of us presumably at one time
consented. But in this scheme, there are two radical
limitations on self-government: majority rule, and
delegated leadership. The people, in our democracy, do
not rule themselves; nor does the majority rule the
minority. Persons elected by the majority rule all the
people. And the particular policies pursued by these
leaders are largely Uetermined by what the leaders think
best for the people.
It should be stressed at this point that we voters seldom vote on issues. There is an occasional local referendum or bond issue on the ballot, to be sure, but by and
large the label next to the lever in the voting booth
contains a name. We vote for persons. Some of those
persons represent us, as they say, in the discharge of
their prescribed duties. Others - most notably the
President of the United States and the Vice-President of
the United States - serve no representative function at
all. We elect them to rule for four years. Their powers
are not, of course, absolute; we are not in the business
of electing dictators. But their powers are very substantial - particularly, as things have gone in recent years,
in the area of foreign affairs. We elect people to set our
foreign and domestic policies.
When Nixon propounds a Doctrine (bearing his
name) to the rest of the world he does so on the authority of the majority of the citizens who voted in the last
election. Yet no majority of our citizens was consulted
in the formulation of that Doctrine. Nor did we have a
chance to ratify it prior to promulgation. We don't, in
fact, even have a chance to officially address ourselves
to it until the next occasion arises to vote for a President. At which time, of course, we will not be voting on
the Nixon Doctrine. We will be voting for, or against,
Nixon. Hopefully our decision will be made on the basis
of what, on balance, Nixon has or has not done - of
which the Nixon Doctrine will be but a (very small)
part. Indeed, by the time of the 1972 election, the chan3

ces are very great that few of us will even ponder the
merits of the Nixon Doctrine prior to casting our votes.
I am emphasizing the fact that in our democracy we
lend, by the vote, our corporate authority to our tulers;
we furnish them with the moral power to rule. The People's Peace Treaty, however, suggests that Nixon does
not rule; it suggests that we rule - ourselves, our country, each other. Thus the treaty can be seen as representing an attempt to put political as well as moral power
back into the hands of the people - the powers to rule,
directly. It is, to that extent, fundamentally at variance
with American democratic principles.
I should mention, before going further, that this
analysis will not, in my estimation, furnish grounds
either to sign or to spurn the treaty. What I am saying
about the treaty is not that its sponsors are trying to slip
past a war-weary electorate an instrument which would
undermine the foundations of our democracy; still less
am I saying that the intention behind the treaty just
is to undermine the democracy. On the contrary, I take
the motivation of the treaty's sponsors to be altogether
honorable. Butevenifthe motivation weren't honorable,
it seems to me that signing the treaty may very well be
a proper action for a responsible citizen to take. I say
this because massive support of the treaty will have, at
best, symbolic effect. The most it can accomplish is the
certification of public opinion; in that sense, signing the
treaty is much like signing your name to an opinion
poll. If this act has any political consequences at all,
the consequences will be similar to any dramatic demonstration of public opinion on the war.
Nevertheless, the sort of technique being employed
in this instance to express public opinion is not without
significance in its own right - especially when we see
it in relation to other recent proposals for citizen involvement in policy formation. One such idea would
have voters register their preference on issues by means
of a device attached to their television sets. There would
be debates on the issue, and following the presentation
of two or more alternatives the viewer would be asked to
register his position. Once again, it is far from clear that
this vote would have any binding force on the people's
representatives or on the President. But it is not unreasonable to suppose that 'f such techniques were per4

fected, there could well arise substantial sentiment in
favor of the results of the vote being binding on the nation's leadership.
The point is that under such a system, the people
themselves would bear direct responsibility for political
decision-making. Some limitation of the available policy
alternatives would perhaps still have to be provided by
elected political leaders, but their chief function would
change dramatically from policy determination to policy administration.
The idea of a People's Peace Treaty hints at some
such change in leadership roles on the part of our representatives and the Chief Executive. The proposed treaty
is a move designed to make political leaders more responsive to the will of the electorate on a specific issue.
An extension of the idea would bind political leaders to
decisions of State made by the electorate itself, directly
expressed by majority vote on a given issue. This version of Participatory Democracy, I am saying, is radically different from the current form of government.
The question now arises as to whether such a revision
of political organization has anything much to recomment it. In boldest outline, the question comes down to
whether it is preferable to choose one person, or one
group of persons, to make your political decisions for
you, or to rely directly on the decision-making ability
of a majority of your countrymen.
There is little reason to trust the wisdom of the American people in selecting their political leaders. What
accounts for the acceptable level of leadership so far in
evidence in our history is not, I think, the sagacity of
the electorate. It is, rather, the immense complexity of
the "political system" itself. The sifting and winnowing
process a Presidential candidate must undergo is, for
example, perhaps as good a guarantee of quality in the
final product as any guarantee might be. When, at fouryear intervals, the American people are offered a choice
between two persons, each of whom has made it to the
top of his political ladder, the "choice" available to the
people is already radically foreshortened. But if this
system offers no very interesting alternatives when it
comes to election day, it at least ensures that both al-

- From the Preamble, The Peoples Peace Treaty
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drastic change in the method of decision-making in our
democracy, even if everyone in the country signs it. But
the suggestion it contains - that of bypassing the normal
channels of political rule - is worth pondering. It is
sad that this suggestion should ever have arisen, for the
fact that it has arisen indicates how unresponsive our
leaders have been to the will of the people in their charge.
Thus it is not unreasonable to argue that it is the leaders
themselves who are responsible for the development of
maneuvers (even if they are largely symbolic maneuvers)
which would strip them of their moral and political
powers.

ternatives are pretty safe. No matter how badly the people vote, they won't be able to hurt themselves much.
The replacement of this imperfect but solid method of
political organization with any system that offers possibilities of perfection but which threatens to undermine
solidity should give all of us cause for reflection. The
People's Peace Treaty in fact will accomplish no such

The People's Peace Treaty is not a subversive document in fact. It is, however, subversive in theory. That
is because it is truly democratic in theory, whereas our
present form of government is not. And however good
pure democracy might sound in theory, one needs to
consider how appealing it would be in fact. I, for one,
have my doubts about it. But then, I have doubts about
most everything.

,
I
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On Second Thought
We ordered a pitcher of beer for the four of us at a
pizza parlor. The proprietor looked at my wife and
asked, "Is this young lady over 21 ?" The pressures of
our culture are such that she was immensely flattered,
and I was pleased with her. We should have been insulted.
I have seen fifty-two summers come and go, and I
am glad for every one of them. Why should I want to
be mistaken for what I was when I was twenty-one?
Insecure, brash, afraid and self-assertive, trying to cover
up my lack of knowledge with a show of certainty. Sure
that I had the answers to rebuild the world, but knowing
beneath the sureness that life couldn't be that simple
or someone else would have rebuilt it long ago. Worried and anxious as though my God were grading me
and I would not pass.
I am much happier today than I was thirty years ago.
I have far less responsibility than I had then, because
I assume less. I have learned that there are many wiser
men than I, many better men than I, and that together
we are not really going to change very much in this
God-visited planet. I have learned how to adapt to the
stupidities and angers of other men because I have seen
my own stupidities and angers for thirty years, and I ·
have watched my world adapt to them, forgive them,
and ignore them.
When I was twenty-one, I knew the meaning of grace.
It was a doctrine entirely reasonable, that fit with perfect clarity into a body of truth about men. The whole
system had been carefully taught to me, and my grades
April, 1971
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in the learning process had been reasonably high. It
never occurred to me that the system was being taught
by older men, who were trying in the futile way of men
to transmit wisdom across a generation gap to one who
did not yet know the meaning of truth.
I have learned a little since. I now know at least this
much, that truth cannot be put into a book, however
true the book might be. I have learned that grace is
not a doctrine that fits logically into other doctrines.
I am beginning to see that grace is the way to live among
my fellowmen, following my Lord Jesus who is the
Truth. I can say that the Bible is the source and norm
of teaching, but it is awe before the Lord that is the beginning of wisdom.
I do not want to be twenty-one. I do not want to be
mistaken for twenty-one. I do not envy anyone who is
still twenty-one. When I was twenty-one I thought
everything had to be right and true. Now I can hope
that it will be forgiven and accepted. I can even accept
the shame that it has taken me these thirty years to begin
to learn and to believe.
It just may be that one of the things we still must do
to save the world is to honor again the aged man, as our
God so well reminds us. Not the fifty-two-year-olds we are just kindergartners in wisdom. Not the aged men
who yearn for youth, who believe the young can save
them. Honor the aged men who know that the worship
of youth is false, who realize that age has brought them
wisdom, who have adapted to the folly of man in the
grace of gur Lord Jesus Christ.
5
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America the Beleaguered
By JAMES A. NUECHTERLEIN
Ass istant Professor of Histo r y
Queens Uni versity
Kingston, Ontario

We are endlessly reminded these days that the only
solutions for our problems are radical ones, since it is
by definition only radicals who can go to "the roots " of
our difficulties. There is some sense in this (who can
deny that it is necessary to attack problems at their base?)
but difficulty arises in that the term "radical " has customarily been reserved for the extremes of the political
spectrum, particularly the extreme left. Since it is something less than a self-evident truth that fundamental
analysis and prescription is conceivable only from the
outer boundaries of political discourse, it should be possible to redeem "radical " from its normal connotation
of extreme left or right and attempt in its name an analy sis of our discontents that begins and ends somewhere
in the political center. Thus the sub-title of this piece
below and thus the following diagnosis of current political pathology.

The View from the Radical Center
What follows is directed almost exclusively against
the left. This should not be understood either as an
implicit endorsement of the far right (by which I mean
roughly that body of political opinion beginning with,
say, Barry Goldwater and proceeding onward and downward to George Wallace, Robert Welch, the Minutemen
and other insanities) or as an underestimation of the
right's potential political weight and danger. What is
attempted here is analysis of political thought, and the
simple fact is that serious political discussion in America (though not political influence) has been and still is
confined largely to the left, William F. Buckley, Jr. and
his little band of brothers at National Review to the
contrary notwithstanding. This is, one can believe, unfortunate, since it limits the range and richness of our
ideological options, but it remains a fact. It is an extraordinarily rare occurrence, for example, for a truly
conservative position to have any influence whatever
in university and other intellectual circles. Political
conservatism as an electoral reality is alive and well
in America but as an ideology it remains the "thankless
persuasion" that Clinton Rossiter so aptly described
some time ago. For this reason, then, this view from the
center aims its attention at the left.
And the view is alarming. What we face, in broadest
terms, is the old romanticism of the new left. From that
perspective, the description of our ills is well-nigh overwhelming. Things, we are told, are in a terrible, even
intolerable, state. America is rotten. Instead of a society
based on peace, brotherhood and abundance, we see instead the perpetuation of war, racism and pove;ty. The
6

System (or the Establishment or the Power Structure)
has failed. At best it can be given One Last Chance before whatever it is that looms beyond despair and into
the apocalypse brings the nation to its rightful doom.
We face , at the least, widespread "trashing" and, at the
most, full-scale revolution. The prospects for ultimate
salvation are slim: a society resting precariously on a
selfish materialism has but a remote hope that somehow
a saving remnant composed of the young, the poor and
the black (and perhaps a few middleclass intellectuals)
might redeem its political soul.
The political style accompanying all this is entirely
appropriate to the analysis. The new politics of conscience, having consigned the old politics of compromise to moral outer darkness, confronts us with the nonnegotiable demand as the standard opening item of
political discourse, and any suggestion that such a demand might be non-fulfillable as well is greeted by the
protesters' most prized weapon: moral outrage. It is this
capacity for sustained indignation that seems most admired by friends of the new politics. The point to be
emphasized about the young activists, we are regularly
reminded, is that above all they care ; the fact that their
caring so frequently takes such strident and violent
forms is supposedly a proof of both the desperateness of
our plight and the depth of their concern, and should
in any case not prevent us from recognizing and applauding the high moral purpose that is the hallmark
of the love generation. Sincerity and idealism cover ,
apparently, a multitude of sins.
But why, as the kids would say, get so uptight about
it all? Haven't the young always been idealistic, and
often (at least to older eyes) unreasonably so? Isn't this
the prerogative of youth ? Do we really want a generation of young old men , prematurely wise, compromising
their moral ideals before they have even been tested?
So young people lack balance and judgment - so what
else is new?
What is new, first of all, is the incredible seriousness
with which this generation is taken in its political and
moral pronouncements. We not only listen with rapt
attention to the post-adolescent temper tantrums of
our Mark Rudds or Mario Savios or whoever, we nod in
sad and penitent agreement at their scornful rejection
of e verything their elders have done, sought and
dreamed. Even if the young sometimes exaggerate, it
is said, even if their denunciations display neither discrimination, charity or wit, they must not only be heard ,
they must be heeded; we must, above all, Listen to What
the Kids are Trying to Tell Us. No matter how absurd.
The Cresset
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If it is true that young people have always been idealistic, it is also true that their innocent vision of what
society should be has never before in American history
been taken as a serious norm against which present
reality is properly judged.
More important than the seriousness with which the
judgments of the activist youth are taken is the extent to
which middle-aged liberals have adopted the youthful
stance of moral absolutism, with all its consequences.
Wholesale rejection of American civilization, easy acceptance of violence and loose talk of revolution are not
restricted to underground newspapers; one can readily
find similar attitudes expressed in the pages of respected
journals like the old left Nation or the indefatigably
cerebral New York Review of Books. (Radical chic recently infested fashionable literary and academic society
to an extent inconceivable a few short years ago.) Last
month's political madness becomes this week's advanced
opinion and will likely be tomorrow's received wisdom.
What has been lost sight of among the young (of all
ages) on the far left has been any reasonable reckoning
of what politics is and is not, of what it can and cannot
do. Perhaps most basic to this is a very simple but remarkably pervasive social fallacy: if there is a discernible problem, there must be a feasible solution. Out of
this grows the belief that if only we really wanted to, we
could obliterate from our society the evils that plague us .
Aggression, prejudice and injustice are not, in this view,
among the terrible concommitants of human frailty;
they are instead historical and moral anachronisms no
longer tolerable in an Aquarian age.

What if the Intolerable is Unavoidable?
Underlying this illusion is the implicit assumption
that the natural state of man in society is devoid, or at
least nearly so, of suffering and conflict. If in fact, then,
things like aggression, prejudice and injustice persevere, they do so either because of particular evil men or
because of a generally evil system. Such a presupposition is necessary to the very conception that, if we
wished, we could rid ourselves of major social problems;
the claim that the current state of affairs is intolerable
makes sense only on the assumption that it is avoidable.
It is probably this assumption that best explains the
otherwise surprising inability of so many liberals to
answer effectively the charges and demands of the extreme left. The virtually masochistic acceptance on
college campuses and elsewhere of the most outrageous
demands and actions from militants of whatever color
or age makes sense only when one understands the burden of guilt under which many middle-class liberals
operate. They cannot effectively respond to moral outrage because they substantially accept the indictment
offered against their generation, and they do so because
they basically agree that injustice, privation and all the
rest are intolerable and/or avoidable. And so they all
too readily admit that We Have Failed and We Are All
Guilty.
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The point being argued here, of course, is not that
all social problems are insoluble. We are not mere helpless victims of a capricious universe. But we must distinguish carefully between the things we can and cannot
accomplish. We must know the difference between minor problems that can be solved relatively easily and
quickly, major problems that might allow of solution in
the long range but are capable in the short-run only of
amelioration, and the eternal problems that lie beyond
institutional or other arrangements and that inhere in
the conditions of our humanity. Thus, for example,
while racial discrimination embodied in law can, with
effort, be ended quickly, and general prejudice against
Blacks, or at least its social effects, can probably be virtually eliminated over a course of decades (though not
over any much briefer time span), the elements of fear,
arrogance and hatred that initially produce any specific
discrimination are embedded in human nature and are
not, at least on the evidence to date, subject to substantial alteration. In brief, while we can solve some problems quickly and can gradually reduce the negative social effects of others, we cannot produce a society in
which souls are greened and unselfish love abounds.
Only when it is again recognized that conflict is the
natural state of things in social relations can we return to
a politics of realism. Disagreements among individuals
and interest groups are natural and legitimate, and
these differences produce real complexities and real
pain; politics is not most of the time on most issues best
understood as a morality play. Demands on men and institutions that, in effect, depend on transcendence of
human limitations for their fulfillment are evidence not
of higher sensibility but of social irresponsibility. That
a man makes "idealistic" or "moral" protests against
things as they are does not, contrary to much current
wisdom, absolve him of the responsibility of showing, at
the least, that available alternatives exist. In the end,
and however venerable the cliche, a responsible politics must remain the art of the possible.
It is perhaps necessary to remind ourselves again
that democracy is a process, and not a set of policy prescriptions. Men of good will can and do disagree on
major issues, and the assumption of one side in a policy
dispute that its moral superiority frees it from the implications of majority rule is destructive of democratic
society. The minority has the right to be heard; it does
not have the right to insist that its demands be met.
There are times, of course, when a decent man finds
that he cannot in conscience abide by the majority decision, but surely the occasions that require active civil
disobedience are not nearly so numerous as current
rhetoric and practice would indicate. The bonds of the
social compact are surprisingly fragile, as we are currently discovering, and a deliberate action to weaken
them is justifiable only in the most extreme circumstance.
It is at this point that we approach the heart of our
current differences, for those whose rhetoric and action
7

are here under attack would claim that our circumstances are extreme, that our current psychological malaise
results from the failure of the political system to solve
or even effectively to tackle the very real social, economic and moral issues that confront us. That our problems are serious is of course beyond reasonable argument; it is the extent (and precise nature) of the crisis
that is under debate, along with the problem of how best
to respond to it. We face the extraordinarily difficult
problem of attempting to define what is or is not a tolerable state of affairs in society.
We can begin most easily in the negative: a society
without order is not tolerable. One had always imagined
that this proposition was in the nature of a universally
acknowledged first principle, but the frighteningly
widespread acceptance among us of violence as a political weapon suggests that even first principles require
occasional restatement and reaffirmation. It is not so
much that any except political crazies come out in favor
of violence, but that all sorts of people who should know
better either explain it away ("Of course one can't
approve of violence, but what would you do if you were
(check one] black, poor, young, alienated, outraged,
etc.") or else condemn it on purely tactical grounds
("Violence is bad because it brings out the blackshirts").
That necessary point being made, it doesn't take us
very far, since, as is so frequently noted, nations like
Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union have created orderly
societies that most of us would not find particularly
tolerable.

God is not Alive and Well as Politics
To approach the problem of definition in a positive
way requires adopting both a comparative and a historical perspective. It does not make much sense to say that
America is rotten unless one means by that that it is
rotten compared ·either to other existing societies or to
its own past. Any other approach involves insuperable
difficulties. If we argue, for example, that a tolerable
America requires a higher level of moral performance
than would apply to other societies we are guilty of perpetuating the old myth of American superiority; there
isn't, after all, much difference between "America is
the greatest nation that ever was" and "America should
(or must) be the greatest nation that ever was." Or, if
we judge America against some abstract standard of our
own making, then we are simply involved in easy moralizing, "easy" because our judgments are answerable
not to standards of reality but to whatever theoretical
norm we wish to create.
One must be very careful here. The argument is not
that citizens of any nation should ever refrain from trying to improve the moral workings of their society; it is
the quite distinct point that judgments concerning the
moral performance of any nation at any time cannot
reasonably be made in isolation. There are dangers of
parochialism for the critics as well as the boosters of
American society.
8

All this does not, of course, provide us with a specific
yardstick for measuring the performance of the American nation, but it does perhaps suggest some guidelines
within which individual citizens can make their own
measurements. Such guidelines are important in arriving at judgments that neither sell our potentialities
short nor make demands that exceed the limits of the
possible. It is the latter danger that seems clear and
present at this time; there are certainly Americans that
are complacent today, but America as a society almost
as certainly is not.
The charge of complacency is not unfamiliar to those
of us who came to maturity in the 1950's. Applied to the
public political discourse and policy of the time, the
charge is not inaccurate, but as a characterization of the
political thought of the period it is inadequate. The best
thinkers of the decade were engaged not in some mindless American celebration, as is often charged, but in a
rethinking of the American experience that attempted
to add depth and rigor to the often soft liberal orthodoxies of the Thirties and Forties. In the process they
came to discard many of the old progressive political
dualisms (the oppressors vs. the oppressed, the interests vs. the people) in favor of new categories that, they
thought, more fully captured historical reality. The
characteristic social analysts of the time emphasized
complexity, ambiguity, paradox, irony, mystery, tragedy. In so doing, they necessarily sacrificed the certainties of the Manichean persuasion; they were less
assured than were their precedessors or their successors
precisely who were the villains and who the heroes in
any given social situation.
Perhaps they went too far in that direction, perhaps
too easily or too often an awareness of complexity became an excuse for inaction; certainly each political
generation, having its own special virtues, has perforce
its own special weaknesses. But whatever their limitations, they understood better than can our current radicals the ambiguities and pitfalls of the moral life. In
that understanding they assiduously avoided the terrible simplicities of broad moral judgments, especially
as applied to peoples and nations. We might do well to
cultivate their virtues.
Maybe we could begin by avoiding nonsensical pronouncements that prove America's failure by comparing her highest ideals with her actual accomplishments,
or that seize upon every crisis to predict the imminent
collapse of the social system. The primary issue here
is not fairness, or even intellectual and moral clarity,
but rather the costs to public morale that such prophecies and imprecations cumulatively generate. If John
Lindsay tells us often enough that we are in the midst
of a kind of collective nervous breakdown that threatens
the foundations of the nation it is entirely possible that
in time the prophecy will indeed self-fulfill, especially
if it is accompanied by similar declarations from dozens
of other public figures whose basic message is that
The Cresset

America is deservedly destroying itself through massive moral collapse.
An "idealism" that consistently demands what cannot
be delivered and that regularly arouses expectations
that cannot be met eventually takes an awful toll in
public frustration, bitterness and loss of comity. To
demand a politics that approaches purity is, in the end,
not really moral at all; it is actually the ultimate abdication. The beginning of social wisdom is the acknowledgement that there are no New Jerusalems.
One final point. It is increasingly evident that many
of the rhetorical and other excesses of political America
derive from the intolerable burden we too often place
upon political life. It might be well for us to reassert
the ultimate primacy of the private realm over the public, or at least to avoid confusing the two. Politics can
serve public needs, but it can do little to repair damaged
psyches or reduce existential anguish. The personal
demons that dwell in us all will not be exorcised by
collective political cleansing. Whether or not we believe
that God is dead, we should at least know where not to

look for Him. To transcendentalize politics trivializes
religion and poisons public affairs; it robs the religious
of ultimate spiritual consolation and injects into public
life absolute values that make the democratic process
unworkable. In the end, our deepest personal needs
and aspirations lie beyond the public arena, beyond the
effects for good or for evil of particular political and
economic arrangements.
The foregoing analysis implies no preferred position
on the political spectrum within the limits of the possible; it simply supposes that those limits exist and that
we ignore them at our peril. It would be both absurd and
pretentious to prescribe a specific program for the political recovery of America; that men of good will and
intelligence can disagree about these things has been
one of the central arguments of this essay. One suspects
that it is no great revelation that our political hope lies
somewhere in the political center and that the far funny
left has little of value to offer us, but perhaps it can be
offered as a necessary, if modest, beginning to the restoration of civility and sanity in the politics of the
Republic.

Church Music in a Pluralistic Society
By HEINZ WERNER ZIMMERMANN
Director of the Berlin School of Sacred Music
West Berlin, Germany

What can the gospel and music do for each other?
What can they do for each other today?
We may also ask, "What can the gospel do for music?"
This part of the question is seldom heard. Much more
often we hear the question, "What can music do for the
gospel, for the divine service, for the church?"
The most pat answer and probably also the most frequent is: "Music should bring people to church so that
they can hear the gospel." Everybody answering like
this makes music a means to an end with no essential
value in itself. The loss of church music would not be
lamented by him if the desired goal of increasing church
attendance could be more cheaply achieved by the provision of free beer. People who think this way are not
particularly musical. Any kind of music will do, good or
bad, for the divine service so long as it increases church
attendance. A little while ago Gregorian was the thing;
now it is rock; tomorrow electronic music. Discrimination is not called for; the best church music is that
which happens at the moment to get the most people
off their bottoms.
If this were all that music can do for the gospel we
would never have the incalculable treasure of church
music which is our heritage and which still continues to
grow. If music had been used only as a lure in the divine
April, 1971

services of the past none of the forms of church music
would have arisen, neither hymnody nor chorale works,
nor motets, nor cantatas, nor oratorios.
What else is there that music can do for the Gospel?
In our search for an answer there are two examples
that show what church music has been capable of. In the
sixteenth century an astonished Jesuit observed that
Luther had won more souls for the Reformation with
his hymns than with his theology. And in the nineteenth
century an avowed enemy of Christianity, Friederich
Nietzsche, once confessed that a hearing of Bach's St.
Matthew Passion had power to almost win him over
again to Christianity.
Here plainly church music was more than mere tickling of ears or merchandising gimmicks; here, music
is a witness for the gospel. Here, in Luther and in Bach,
it was the gospel which first did something for music.
All that music has done for the gospel - and that is not
something small - is here too so that we can perceive
and clearly feel what the gospel has first done for music.
Here, as in all authentic church music, we have music
which expresses its having been taken hold of by the
gospel.
What gain does the gospel have from such musical expression of the way of the gospel?
9

The gospel receives another dimension of persuasive
power. When a preacher strives to bring the gospel
home to his hearers, he not only uses logic but he also
gives expression to his having been taken hold of by the
gospel and to his being caught up in it. So also church
music carries the gospel further than its systematic explication. In church music the gospel shows that it can
so fill the whole existence of a man that the man cannot
but "sing and tell" of it.
Already in the oldest forms of church music we find
this exultant elevation. In the single voiced melodies of
Gregorian we clearly hear an exuberance in its way of
speaking. Speaking has taken wings. The natural rhythm of the speaking voice is only slightly modified and
elevated by the chanting of the lines of melody. It is
elevated, enlarged, and so can be taken in more clearly.
The stirring power of words in a vital statement is taken
up into the musical melody and therefore can be repeated.
The next oldest form of church music, introduced by
Ambrose, is the "hymnus" which expresses particularly
in the texts this vibrant dimension of having been taken
hold of by the gospel. This form of the "hymnus" gives
the congregation the possibility of speaking together in
a way that lifts them all up together. Here exultation
calls for a short melody, simply constructed, so that
every member of the congregation can join in the singing.
However, since the fifteenth century and since the
polyphonic masters of the Low Countries, church music
has aspired to and achieved even more. It aspired to be
a musical image of God's creation. In the Middle Ages
music, as one of the liberal arts, kept company with
mathematics and astronomy. Each voice of the polyphony moved according to strict rules recalling the
planets in their courses and the beauty of the harmonia
mundi, the music of the world.
Between Josquin and Schuetz this musical cosmos was
brought down to earth. The single voices of the polyphony take on the character of men's voices and follow
the tone and accent of the spoken language. The musical
harmonia mundi becomes the musical expression of the
Christian congregation in which each individual member has his role in singing the praise of God.
Further developments of church music were evoked
as the individual instruments of instrumental music
came into their own in the seventeenth century and as
dance music pattems were taken into church music.
New forms were introduced. Buxtehude's church concerts brought into church music modem musical metres
and rhythms as also Bach's cantatas brought in modem
dance forms. However, they do not push into church
music as foreign bodies, or as a sort of intermezzo relief.
They are fully integrated and are brought into the service only when they give musical expression to the
sacred text.
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Bach's synthesis of vocal music that speaks and instrumental music that dances brought forward the vocal
music that could speak to dance, and the instrumental
music that could dance to speaking. We are here at the
beginning of the classical period of music which grows
out of the synthesis of religious and secular music individual expression within the framework of a collective scheme.
We find his same synthesis of religious and secular
music in the Viennese classical composers: Hayden,
Mozart and Beethoven.

Toward a Heterogeneous Polyphony
Then, strangely, in the nineteenth century this synthesis is taken apart and we have again a schism between
expressive music and dance music. For this schism in
Germany today we use the terms E-Mus,·k (ernste musik, serious music) and U-Musik (unterhaltungsmusik ,
entertainment music). In The Magt"c Flute, Mozart
could write music expressive of Sarastro and Papageno.
Scarcely a hundred years later the worlds symbolized
by Sarastro and Papageno had become so uncombinable
that each needed its own composer and its own opera.
As Thrasboulos Georgiades points out, The Magic
Flute falls apart into Parsifal and Die Fledermaus.
However, the schism between serious music and entertainment music is nowadays not the only one. In the
last hundred years another splitting has occurred. We
separate the different styles in the history of music. We
have leamed to keep them apart from contemporary
music which we have even leamed to push to the wall .
A hundred years ago. music was contemporary music,
and it cost considerable effort to keep Mozart's great
works from oblivion, and even to make Bach's masterpieces known at all. Today we have the opposite. The
master musicians of our day find small room for their
works on concert programs beside the masterpieces of
the past.
Music today is a plurality of different voices each
claiming its rights. With which of these languages shall
church music speak? Should it be Bach's way? For many
this is the ideal for church music. Should it be Palestrina's way, or that of the Beatles, or that of the avant
garde? All these are possible.
An organist in his improvisation can give authentic
expression to his being taken hold of by the gospel in
the style of Bach, which may be called an organist's
mother tongue. Mahalia Jackson expresses the way she
has been taken hold of in a style we would say belongs
to entertainment music. Anton Weber in the style of
avant garde. In our day faith's music can be of many
different kinds.
Yet in our day it might again be the way of the gospel
to perform the work of musical reconciliation. Perhaps
The Cresset

the gospel will help us to unite to God's praise in the
very different tongues which sound out in our musical
pluralism. Such a reconciliation could not be by force or
suppression, but it could be by means of a new polyphony which acknowledges the individuality of each
voice and yet leads them together into a higher polystylistic wholeness.
The pluralism of our musical styles, which is a counterpart to the pluralism of our time, is a loss as long as
the different styles stand off from one another and wage
war without understanding. It is abundance , however,
as soon as the different styles are brought together in
polyphonic reconciliation.
What could be done for the gospel by such pluralistic
polyphony? We retum to where we began.
The gospel would have this: a witness that it is also
able to work powerfully in the chaos of our contemporary music, working a lively work of reconciliation.
Church music that reconciles in itself the heterogeneous
styles of our time would add vi tal cogency to the church in
her proclamation of reconciliation. Church music would
show prophetically in such a work of art what the gospel
would do for the whole world.
And what boon would there be from such church music for the individual member of the Christian congregation?
We must first reject the folly of supposing that we can
ever achieve again one unified modem style for church
music. All that we have musically inherited cannot be
thrown into oblivion. We shall continue to live with the
great works from the past. The music of the past is in
our musical blood. In the church also we shall continue
to live the great works of the past. We shall not throw
them aside in closed-minded iconoclasm. With all our

efforts to create new songs for the church we shall continue to sing the old hymns. With all our efforts to create
new music for organ and choir for divine worship we
shall continue to hear the works of those masters who
have gone before us. We shall creatively carry forward
that tradition in our worship and not abolish it.
Whoever dreams up a divine service with music and
liturgy tailored exclusively to the "here and now" falls
behind our contemporary awareness of pluralism which
cannot be squashed into a narrow "here and now." This
criticism fits many of the "contemporary services"
which are so much applauded nowadays. They would
become a danger for the church if they were used every
Sunday.
"Contemporary services" have a useful role to play a
few times in the year and can be helpful toward an expanded understanding of the many, different forms of
expression in our day. They can also help the individual member of the congregation to make his way through
this multiplicity. Every stylistic one-sidedness should
be avoided. Here, in such services, should be the place
of great, pluralistic music for the church, reconciling
in a new "heterogeneous polyphony" the different contemporary and historical idioms.
The voice of the gospel within such a new polyphony
would be one among the heterogeneous many, but this
would reflect the way the church in our day is one voice
among many and contrary voices. A polystylistic polyphony would bring home to the hearer that in the multiplicity of our modem world the gospel is the cantus
firmus which reconciles those who are set against each
other, and points them to the worship of God as the
common goal of all men.

What is Human about the Humanitiesl
By ERIC DEAN
Evan s Professor of Religion
Wabash College
Crawfordsville, Indiana

An ancient canard directed against the Sophists was
that they took money for enabling men to "make the
worse appear the better case." Certainly this objection
to the Sophists must continue to give pause to all teachers of speech. They are professionally committed to
helping students improve their rhetoric whether those
same students will be speaking on behalf of good or evil,
the better or worse. Surely a rhetorician must occasionally have been tempted, when confronted with a student whose views he abhored, to teach him a few effective errors. "Be sure to talk down to you audience so
that they may recognize you as an authority figure." A
Sophist could possibly make such counsel sound fairly
convincing.
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Having thus twitted my colleagues in speech for years
about their being Sophists under a newer guise, I was
recently sobered to realize that my position is not so
very different from theirs. I was in a seminar with some
older men (their age is important; they had firm opinions of their own), and we were discussing the death
dialogues of Socrates. The question occurred to me:
On the assumption that few of these men are going to
conclude that this kind of philosophical dialogue justifies civil disobedience, then what has been the point of
the seminar? Of course, they leamed a bit about Socrates and the nature of Athenian justice, but we had not
made the assignment for the purpose of these bits of
historical information. How might one justify an acti11

vity from which there is really no hope of deriving
consensus?
And, of course, what is true of an individual seminar is
true in spades of the whole project of liberal education.
It is rather like the freshmen going back to his hillcountry shack and being asked , for the delectation of
his relatives, to "say something college."
Are teachers of the humanities in the business of
casting pearls before swine - lecturing on the arcane
mysteries of the inner workings of the Trinity to the
young when they are more interested in their own
plumbing and wiring? Are we in the business of helping barbarians put on airs - teaching generations of
profligate entrepreneurs to spell and write literately?
Do we teach them contents?
Do we teach them skills?
Actually, of course, students do retain an occasional
fact from their course work with us. My colleague in
German, when we walk at night on campus, can point
out Casseopeia's Chair and thus shows that his course in
astronomy was not for naught. Too, it is obviously the
case that students sometimes are more literate by dint
of our efforts. But, as is trite to comment, a humanities
faculty can take little satisfaction from a contents/skills
justification of its teaching enterprise.

A Countertype to the Humanities
It is obvious that the salvation of the race does not
come from increments of knowledge. While our style of
life is more comfortable for all of the discoveries of the
past generations, it is dubious whether the race is, in
sum, happier or even more comfortable. We drive to
our psychiatrist's office in ever more luxurious cars;
and few Vietnamese are being killed by aerial bombardment save at the hands of college graduates.
This is, to repeat, trite. Of course, we have long since
known that it is wisdom that men should seek, and that
an educational system unaware of the difference between
knowledge and wisdom is likely to be dehumanizing if
not demonic. What we have never satisfactorily clarified is how one may go about pursuing wisdom . It is
the kind of dilemma to which Wittgenstein refers in the
preface to his Tractatus. The first sentence reads, "Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who
has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it - or at least similar thoughts." Or, as it is expressed in Plato's Meno, " ... if (a man) knows, he has no
need to enquire; and if not, he cannot .... " It seems to
follow that any wisdom a student may have developed
through his undergraduate years is no proven function
of what we did to him. Wise or foolish, he is wise and
foolish on his own account.
Rather like good manners or bad manners, the humanities can only be referred to in the plural, and one
inclines to the view that almost any discipline may be
included in their number. As I hope to indicate later,
the sciences are not categorically excluded from the
humanities in the sense here suggested. It will appear,
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further , that the disciplines typically called the humanities may, for reasons I shall specify, be traduced so
that they are not humanities in fact.
For the sake of contrast, I should like to suggest a
countertype to the humanities. So far as I know, there is
only one discipline which is concerned to exemplify
the countertype in any degree of purity, and even here
the exemplification does not rule out the humanities
quotient. The typology is that of a the tic discipline, and
I think of its exemplification in logic or pure mathematics. The thetic discipline is one in which propositions
appear, but in which they are manipulated in a purely
formal fashion. Ever since Aristotle it has been recognized that such a discipline is concerned with validity
rather than truth. Not that this is cause for scandal. It
is simply the case that there exists, and can exist, no
formal test of truth.
The logical proof properly so-called simply manifests the validity of conclusions to be drawn from whatever premise may be assumed. The continual concern
of the logician is for elegance - which suggests an
aesthetic consideration, but this may simply be defined
as the achievement of ever more primitive deductions.
This is to say, one strives for ever shorter chains of argument leading to the desired valid conclusion. There is
also the effort to obtain systems employing a minimum
of logical operators.
It would be foolish to deny the significance in respect
of logic of interest and insight, but one's consuming passion for theorems and the ease with which one proceeds
to new deductions has little bearing on the nature of
the discipline per se. The test is for validity, an entirely
formal notion , and, so far as logic is concerned, the moon
may just as well be made of green cheese and Socrates
be immortal.
Logic is, as I have suggested, the pure type of the
thetic discipline. So far as logic is concerned propositions need have no content; it is enough to know whether
they shall be co~sidered true or false. The determination of truth or falsity is no part of logic.
A major group of the non-humanities disciplines are
less than purely thetic, but are treated, for the most
part, as if they were thetic. In much the same way as
one is inducted into the operations of logic, so is one
inducted into the natural and even the social sciences.
To be sure, there are genuine questions having to do
with the evaluation of data and the development of new
models. But where all but the growing edge of the
disciplines are concerned, the field is to be regarded as
a constellation of mutually defined concepts to be
grasped as a whole.
There is considerable charm to the notion that experience, like knowledge, is built up from primitive
elements accumulated over time and subsequently organized into meaningful clusters. Notice how very long
it was that the empiricists' primitivism went essentially
unchallenged. Was it not written, as if in tablets of stone,
that man received impressions - discrete impressions
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of oolor, sensations of touch and texture - and that
these, by a process of accumulation, became the experience of, say, a peach. There is now little debate that
even the most primitive sensation is probably contextual and that no one ever has these discrete experiences
of patches of color. What is less frequently recognized,
however, is that the concepts of science are themselves
no less contextual. It is not, as the layman naively imagines, that there are certain basic nubbins of matter
which exist to be thought of in this way and that - as ,
say, by Newton and Einstein. Rather, the way in which
matter is conceived depends on the nature of the model.
There is, of course, a basic question concerning the
nature and interpretation of evidence, but most of the
work in science done by under-graduates is purely formal and thetic. The average laboratory session is the
scientist's counterpart of the Sunday School class - and
about as effective. Despite all the talk about getting a
feel for the material, the symbols on the page are the
primary data; after all, they must be "handed in. "
It is the characteristic of what I wish to call thetic
disciplines that the question of the adequacy of the
symbol is raised either not at all , as in logic, or only on
the periphery of the discipline as taught. As a student
once commented: the picture of science as empirical
generalization would lead to little scientific research of
the standard variety. In other words, if I understood
this student, while as Einstein must comprehend the inadequacies of any model, the average investigator is
pretty much a fundamentalist where the symbols of
his field are concerned. Further, I am suggesting, the
tyro in the field is often little concerned for what the
symbols purport to represent; for him it is a matter of
learning to manipulate a totally formal system of concepts.
This totally formal system has enviable simplicity
as respects teaching and learning, so much so that the
humanities too are often transmuted into the simply
thetic. In order to study poetry a student will learn
about the life and thought of poets and the probable
source of the poets' allusions. The student in religion
will learn the creeds and their antidotes in chronological series. These are obviously ways of studying poetry
and theology, but they are falsifications of the concerns
of poetry and theology.

Do Not Think as a Thinker
There is a long tradition , at least as old as the Sophists,
which wants to suggest that the thetic, with its concern
for formal unities, is a poor instrument for doing justice to the richness of human existence as it is experienced. Socrates and Plato could make logical hay out
of the elliptical theses of the Sophists, but the doctrine
of the forms was, for all its elegance, a pale figure of the
material universe. A passion for unity might seem to
justify the doctrine, but there was a never-ending series of footnotes which needed to be added "to save appearances." Not that the recurrent systems are without
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interest, even fascination, but they could only find the
richness of human experience as a source of contradiction, and thus preferred to regard experience as a cheat
and a sham. Thus does human learning tend to become
-as someone once described science: "The lie commonly agreed to."
The tendency is centrifugal: to take the words about
a situation as if they adequately expressed the situation
and finally to regard them as the form of reality itself.
Now, to quote Protagoras, "Don't quibble about my
use of language, but try to understand what I mean."
Of course, one can justify study of the humanities as
disciplines in the way which one justifies mountainclimbing; they exist to be conquered. Beyond this distortion of their value, however, the humanities exist
to call attention to the human factor at the root of all
humane education. The thetic elements of the humanities so obviously cannot be justified in their own terms.
Unlike logic and pure mathematics, and perhaps in
spite of themselves, the thetic humanities point to that
for whose sake they exist, from whose existence they
derive their value.
In all thetic disciplines the necessary criteria of discourse are necessarily regnant. Anyone who essays to
speak meaningfully , for instance, must needs be
governed by the principle of non-contradiction; it is not
possible for a thing both to be and not to be in the same
respect at the same time. From the point of view of discourse, this principle cannot be violated. Yet it seems to
be the case that existential situations violate this principle. Perhaps it would be better to say that a rule of
language is not a rule of being; yet talking is so characteristic a human activity that we have repeatedly taken
grammar to be the constitutent law of the universe. Man
needs to be freed from this bondage, but the problem is
hardly to be overcome in the realm of formal discourse.
One must attempt to follow Feuerbach's dictum: "Do
not think as a thinker."
The simplest human activity defies adequate description. Imagine, for example, instructing a person to deploy his muscles in such a fashion as to write his own
name. Itissimpleenough to say, "Write your own name."
Imagine, then, the infinitely greater simplification involved in giving a name to an emotional state. Presumably it is sometimes useful to speak of a person's being
in love. Yet even if all were willing to stipulate that the
term was truly attributed to the individual, it would
surely be improper to think that any further fact can be
said to be entailed. "If he loves her, then .. . ."It has the
form of a meaningful proposition, but is a remarkable
oversimplification of any existential situation.
tion.
That theologians have for centuries been at the job
of "cracking the axiom of reason" suggests that the task
is hardly yet complete however simply it may be accomplished in the form of an argument. But, after all, human
experience is not cumulative - as if each generation
did not need to learn its own lessons. That the argument

13

is not obvious is sufficiently evident if one notes the
obloquy heaped on David Hume for nigh on two hundred years. "Why, he denies the existence of self while
speaking of the self' - as if it were not sufficiently evident that Hume was not intending to deny the self's
existence, but to direct our attention to the fact that the
self is not founded in rationality.
Given the peculiar insensitivity of the tradition to this
crucial insight, we are fortunate whenever the humanities have sufficed to remind us of the man who lives
within all of the talk about man. Occasionally one of
our students uses a metaphor instead of talking about
metaphors and enriches his own existence and ours.
Or he paints a picture or writes a line of music. The human in the humanities is precisely this pursuit. The
counterpart is rather as if one attempted to discover the
significance of a metaphor while convinced that all
terms have only literal meanings.
The problem is, how shall one follow the dictum , "Do
not think as a thinker"?
I propose that it is the very character of the humanities to frustrate any continued attempt exhaustively to
transmute the properly human into the convenient categories of formalized thought. This transmutation is
done in infinitely many high school and college courses
to the everlasting shame of the teaching profession, but
yet, so I must argue, there is an integrity alike to man
and the arts which will frustrate the continued attempt
to make thetic what is essentially not formal.
I said earlier that there is no formal criterion of truth.
We do our students a rank injustice by suggesting that
truth does arise as a natural consequence of argument.
Truth is always, and finally, a function of human judgment, and the humanities are a constant and undeniable
invitation to make the kinds of judgments which are
the means of becoming responsible moral agents.
If this invitation to moral agency is the defining characteristic of the humanities, then, to be sure, the humanities are multiform, but literature, art and music have
a primacy inasmuch as their integrity in this regard is
not to be long flouted, nor successfully even in the short
run. There is the painful honesty of the student who
can talk B-plusish about the sonata form but is honest
enough to say that he has never heard a symphony which
appealed to him. Such a student, it seems to me, has
been better served by music and is a better man than
the individual who tries to persuade him that he knows
reasons for saying that he likes symphonies.
Even if we agreed that our students should pass
through our talk to an appreciation of the medium,
one will be moved to suggest that the media themselves
involve form and the considerable drudgery of acquiring mastery. This is, of course, true. But there is a
clear difference between mastering a medium so that
the fact of mastery is no longer exhibited except to the
ingenuous, and the thetic disciplines in which the formal element is itself the concern.
In this respect we are, surely, much better situated
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given the character of contemporary art and music.
I confess to having· entertained at one time or another
all of the wrong notions about contemporary literature,
art and music: they weren't enjoyable, they were pretentious, formless , infantile, boring in their attempt to
be provocative, and so on. But these "wrong notions"
were entertained often only because one attempted to
get a word of clarification from the artist himself. If
there is a sui generis character to artistic production,
then it surely denies the significance of even the artist's
own commentary.
We have gone through stages when the function of
art was primarily allegorical or just plain representative. Contemporary art is, surely, more nearly parabolic
by nature. Now parables either work or fail; they should
not require footnotes . If parables work, it is because the
hearer supplied the elements necessary. Thus one reads
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moral agency by inviting him to make the judgments
which can alone be his. Of course, moral agency of this
nature can be elicited in any number of fields, including
science. But in fields other than the humanities socalled, the problem of information seems continually
to undercut the justification of the student's deciding.
In fact, of course, no amount of information ever constitutes a man and expert in moral judgments. But there
seem to be so many facts which bear upon judgments
that a student is often misled into thinking that a sufficiency of facts would obviate the need for making a
judgment. Surely it is immoral to permit such an impression to rest undisturbed, but it makes the work of the
teacher - I should prefer to say the so-called teacher less strenuous.
The nature of the humanities is such that one can
never quite convince himself or his students that information about a work or its originator can take the place
of the work taken in and for itself. Properly conceived,
of course, our discussion of the work may itself invite
judgment as a sort of ancillary work. But one might
suggest that, in the several fields in the humanities,
teachers are John the Baptist figures - pointing beyond
themselves. Our pointing may have qualities of eloquence and insight, but the pointing makes no claims for
itself. "Behold ... !" Then is our work a celebration rather
than an unlovely attempt to overcome the implastic
nature of the original.
First, then, the humanities are human in that they are
an invitation to each man to make the judgments and
perform the acts which constitute him a free moral
agent. The second point is that these judgments are
not simply an exercise in the making of judgments but
are themselves significantly moral acts.
It may be difficult for me to get to this second point
because of the long tradition which wants to suggest
that aesthetic judgments are in a class apart from moral
judgments, whereas I assert that all judgments are of a
piece. Here I am reminded of the King James translation of Romans 8:26: "Groanings which cannot be uttered." I have taken a long time to suggest that intellectual utterances are often less than revelatory. But what
about the groans? Surely the same kind of primordial
energy which leads to creative activity flows in the act
of appreciation, and anything which brings a man back
to the springs of being is moral. One might go further
to suggest that the groans mark the overcoming of alienation.
This is not to assert that intellectual activity is in itself an activity alien to human nature. But there is, as
Hume suggests, a constant tendency to take the part for
the whole - as if men were essentially rational, and
further, the rational, the thetic impulse, has no closure
generic to itself. As Kierkegaard argued, reason cannot
find its own limit. That intellectual activity does not
spin on endlessly by the perpetual impulse which is
formally possible is a consequence of the fact that man,
the animal (the embodied, if you prefer), simply tires,
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says "I am satisfied," or for reasons simply impossible
to explicate regards the matter as closed.
One acknowledges that "premature closure" is sometimes a consequence of sloth or even anti-intellectualism,
but it is not the case that every assertion of the limits
of reason constitutes anti-intellectualism. As in such a
philosopher as David Hume, this is rather a claim to a
fuller comprehension of human nature. And it is this
generic comprehension of human nature which the humanities serve, as opposed to the distortions actual and
possible within the thetic. Without making a category
mistake, one can assert that the appreciation of a work of
art is itself a significant moral achievement. It leads to
a confrontation with the deep springs of human existence while frustrating adequate linguistic expression.
In short, to realize the human in the humanities is

itself a moral achievement. This seems to be justifiable
if only for that man seeks his proper nature as his proper
end. I rarely congratulate my dog for his caninity, but
I am often moved by the spectacle of a humane act on
the part of man. To know what is human is, in fact, a
high moral achievement. And the teaching of the humanities are less successfully deformed than other areas
which conduct us to the spectacle of our nature; they
are most likely to induce a sense of what is human, a
feeling for freedom, a demand for dignity.
It was not a Greek but a Hebrew, with all of the genius
of an antimetaphysician, who could write:
Lord, make me to know my end,
And the measure of my days, what it is.
Such a couplet might become the motto for the humanities become humane.

From the Chapel

A Word for Theology
By STEPHEN C. ROSE
Lecturer, Associ11ted Co/leges of the Midwest
Urben Studies Progrem
Chicego, Illinois

In the last decade some of us were faced with so many
"new" theologies that one is loath to add to their number
in this new decade. We likely need a moratorium on
"new" theologies until sufficient experience accumulates
to justify the formulation of any of them in systematic
terms. Meanwhile, in the present mix of proposals and
counter-proposals, I believe that the word liberation
best expresses a dimension of the Gospel which is being
made manifest again in our time.
Liberation rather than hope or the secular city or the
death of God seems the more productive term at present. Liberation can be related specifically to the political dimension of life, since it has application to the
colonial situation here and abroad from which more and
more men seek liberation.
Liberation (tiber) recalls the freedom which the late
Karl Barth suggested should be the primary concern of
American theology in the days ahead. Liberation is an
evocative term in relation to the person, for it applies
to the individual pilgrimage as much as it does the
universal political struggle. It offers a standard for
evaluating secular theology , a context in which some
death of God thought is relevant, and a dimension which
is implied but not sufficiently explicit in the theology
of hope.
Liberation is a process and, like the Gospel, assumes a
condition of bondage from which one needs and seeks
release. It is possible to speak meaningfully of stages of
liberation, both in terms of external political history
and internal experience. Liberation can also be seen as
a state and as a consummation.
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Liberation is happily a term which has been so identified with Third World movements that its use in a
Christian context helps avoid the implications (inherent in some secular theology) that theology is addressing problems primarily from the vantage point of the
affluent white West.
Liberation is the term which has increasingly become
the focus of world conversation. It is a term which gathers up the meanings in the efforts to move away from
the welfare and warfare states toward a world community without colonies and colonialists. Often liberation
is treated in a context which makes it possible to see
parallels with authentic Biblical thought. We ought to
be able to bring to the worldwide concern with liberation the insight and catalytic relevance of the Gospel.
Not long ago some churchmen were discussing and
attempting renewal, predicating their analysis of society
and the Christian mission on the optimism of Pope John
and on the glorious innocence of the civil rights movement which appeared to redress injustices by moral
exertion. Today that analysis is strained to the breaking
point, if not shattered.
At least two things happened. First, we have come to
greater recognition of our bondage, not merely our considerable bondage to personal hang-ups, but also our
political and sociological bondc:.ge. The latter bondage
emerges quite clearly in a colonial analogy in which
white Americans are (willing or not) beneficiaries of a
complex system of cultural, technological, and economic
domination of others. Secondly, having lost our earlier
The Cresset

bearings, we possess no more than temporary certainty
about the way ahead.
Today there is more than a suspicion that a time of
reflection and re-education must precede a struggle for
liberation. I believe that the move from renewal to liberation, from the imagery of smooth institutional change
in a progressive direction to the more Biblical imagery
of profound and sweeping change in all of life has taken
place among many. We can speak of renewal today only
in terms of liberation.
What would be some of the elements that might contribute to a theology of liberation?
First, our dilemma points in the direction of conceiving a new man. It is hardly necessary to document the
manner in which thought moved during the past decade from the consideration of external to internal reality, from notions of political and social adjustment to
perceptions of deep sea changes possibly taking place
within man himself. What is happening has yet to be
described convincingly, and I would hope that the
primary intellectual task in the near future will be to
describe what is actually taking place within us and
around us. Apparently the analyses with which men
-:!ntered this century are no longer adequate and as yet
we have only fragments toward a new synthesis. At
least two suggestions, however, point to the direction in
which the quest for the new man is going. Both come
from psychoanalysts who have moved beyond the classbound, individualist orthodoxies of classical therapies.
R. D. Laing's book, The Politics of Experience, strikes
me as a novel, if often obscure, beginning effort to probe
the alienation of the white European and North American. Says Laing:
We in Europe and North America are the colonists. and in order to
sustain our amazing images of ourselves as God 's gift to the vast
majority of the starving human species, we have to interiorize our
violence upon ourselves and our children and to employ the rhetoric
of morality to describe this process.
In order to rationalize our industrial-military complex, we have to
destroy our capacity to see clearly any more what is in front of, and
to imagine what is beyond, our noses. Long before a thermonuclear
war can come about. we have to lay waste our own sanity. We begin
with the children. It is imperative to catch them in time ... Children
are not yet fools , but we shall turn them into imbeciles like ourselves, with high IQ's if possible.
From the moment of birth, when the Stone Age baby confronts the
twentieth-century mother, the baby is subjected to these forces of
violence, called love, as its mother and father, and their parents
and their parents before them , have been. These forces are mainly
concerned with destroying most of its potentialities, and on the
whole this enterprise is successful. By the time the new humanbeing is fifteen or so. we are left with a being like ourselves, a halfcrazed creature more or less adjusted to a mad world. This is normality in our present age.

Laing's book is an intentionally inconclusive exploration of contemporary alienation, and I have quoted
from it to suggest a trenchant critique of alienation
which may be underway. Within discipline after discipline attention is being given to the question of man himself. But at the same time there is a move away from
April, 1971

simple individualism to a deeper and moral questioning
of the very basis of normality as the world presently
defines it. There is in essence deeply rooted doubt being cast on the entire human enterprise as it is presently
undertaken, and there is a quest for the fundamental
unity of man and men that has been eroded by modern
civilization and its attending horrors.
Laing does not suggest the possibility that contemporary alienation might lead to any historical upheavals
that may be needed to deflect the onward rush of a demented normality. The latter concern is taken up by the
American analyst, Robert Jay Lifton. In his study of
the effects on the survivors of the nuclear blasting of
Hiroshima and in his study of the cultural revolution
in China, Lifton developed the notion that man breaks
in an important way with the immediate past when that
past seems to promise no prospect of immortality. That
is to say, basic psychological changes occur when individual lives are wrenched from the continuities of the
past and when the future is even more unlikely to give
mortal lives at least an historical immortality. I wish
at this point only to introduce Lifton's conception of an
actual new man emerging from the alienation of some
modern young persons in particular. He refers to this
new man as "protean man."
His psychological style . ... is one of interminable exploration and
flux, his self-process characterized by readily easy shifts in belief and
identification. He can readily embrace a set of convictions or respond
to various kinds of symbols and images; his difficulty is maintaining
inner connection with these for more than a brief experimental
interlude.

This new man, says Lifton, has a prevailing tone of
mockery. This mockery may in fact be a specific rejection of moral earnestness and rectitude. It may also be a
means for giving voice to the weakening of "fit" between
the inner and the outer world which is a characteristic
of some of the young in our time. "It is his way," suggests Lifton, "of confronting death."
Lifton goes on to say: "The protean style results from
the radical breakdown in man's more structured relationships to traditional symbols. It is also influenced
by the world-wide revolution in mass communications
which tends to flood the individual psyche with endlessly variable images in every sphere of life."

A Recovery of""Fit"
One implication of Lifton's analysis is that the present movement of history, especially as it is affected by
technology, itself is aiding the process of thrusting men
into totally new relationships with what he has hitherto
conceived as reality. What may be happening and where
it is all going is, of course, difficult to say. But as time
goes on we may find ourselves developing almost
instinctively the consciousness that is needed for survival
in the coming world. Essentially Laing and Lifton are
dealing with the issue of survival through fundamental
change. For Laing what we call mental illness should be
revered as a trip back to the roots of alienation; for
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Lifton survival is intrinsically related to one's sense of
immortality.
I focus on these men for two reasons. First, they remind us that any lively form of liberation will involve a
recovery of "fit" between internal and external experience. Psychology and history are separate departments
in universities, but the realities with which they deal
are inseparable in life. Secondly, they imply that the
process of alienation from present history is natural,
necessary, and a prerequisite to spiritual or vocational
awakening. Liberation is thus related to the variety of
terms and symbols we call death and resurrection.
The focus on liberation in theology is also helpful, for
it connects with the actual process of liberation taking
place at the edges of some of our churches. This process
involves the organization of seminary students, the
spontaneous development of lay and ministerial groups,
the formation of various caucuses to deal with demoninational waywardness, as well as groups for the cultivation of spiritual life. There is also lively growth in
Black theology, communal modes of ministry, and the
dismantling of some bureaucracies. And where iraditional denominational incomes are lacking, communities are forming to support their own ministries.
The principal characteristic of liberation within the
church is the correspondence some people are discovering between the actual Gospel and the present truth .
Part of that truth is the need to confront a world in love
with death - if the actions of the most powerfully sup-

ported men and institutions are indications of what is
loved among us.
The theological exploration of the Gospel under the
aspect of liberation sees reality not as a coherent and
concluded environment but as a semi-chaos where death
and life are in conflict. It moves believing men to become a liberated church in the conflict, taking symbolic
and concrete actions. The Gospel under the aspect of
liberation does not lead to an acceptance of the world
as it is because the lease-holders of the present world
need an evangelical new life offered them as much as
the powerless need to organize themselves to try to
bring the powers into equity. Whatever social goals the
liberated church has, however, need to be defined
principally by those whose oppression is primarily objective rather than subjective.
The liberated church takes from its more religiously
conservative brothers the emphasis on conversion, but
a conversion not to nostalgia or the status quo but to
the agitating and healing stance of Jesus . From
its religiously liberal brothers, it takes seriously the
judgment that anyone who claims to have a corner on
the truth is engaging in obfuscation, and that includes
the liberated church.
Surely liberation carries more possibility for theology
than the secular city, the death of God (minus resurrection), and notions of hope which have scant basis in
fact. Like all words it is corruptible, but it has more
flesh on it than most words do today.

Political Affairs

A Case of Malapportionment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------By ALBERT R.TROST

Seven years ago the United States Supreme Court
ordered the principles of equality and majority rule to
be applied to the U.S. House of Representatives by applying the one-man, one-vote doctrine to the drawing of
congressional district lines. However, unequal representation was not then (nor is it now) the result primarily of malapportioned districts. In the United States
Congress, equality and majority rule are seriously frustrated by the internal organization of the Congress itself. I refer particularly to the seniority rule as it is
applied to committee assignments and the hierarchy
within the standing committees.
Seniority in both the Senate and the House is determined primarily on the basis of uninterrupted service
in the respective chamber. When there is a tie in length
of service, factors such as previous public office may be
used to establish the seniority rank. Seniority is the
only consideration in determining the hierarchy with
the standing committees of the House and Senate. The
member of the majority party with the greatest tenure
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on the committee is entitled to be chairman, and the
minority party member with the greatest tenure is the
ranking minority member . The chairmanship of subcommittees is also determined by seniority. Although
initial assignments to standing committees cannot be
based on seniority, seniority is an important consideration when a man moves from one committee to another,
usually to a position of more influence and prestige.
It is fairly common knowledge that the seniority
system works to the advancement of senators and representatives from one-party states or districts. This means
that the one-party Democratic South is favored, as
are one-party Democratic districts in large cities. For
the Republicans, a rural or suburban seat in the Middle
West is very secure. In the House of Representatives,
where it is possible for the urban and suburban congressman to achieve greater seniority, chairmen and minority ranking members tend to be only slightly more conservative than the average representative.
In the Senate, the seniority system has a stronger
The Cresset
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effect in placing more conservative senators in positions of influence in the committees. However, since
certain regions are definitely over-represented among
senior members of the standing committees, there is
no guarantee that they will represent the policy positions of their more junior colleagues. Of the seventeen
standing committees of the Senate, slightly over half
(9) have chairmen from the South. Of the twenty-one
committees in the House, slightly less than half (9)
have chairmen from the South.
To put the effects of the seniority system into sharper
focus, it is useful to examine a situation that occurs in
the present Congress. Louisiana has about 3,500,000
people, about 1.7% of the total population of the United
States. This population entitles Louisiana to eight of
the 435 members of the House, or about 1.8% of the total, which, divided into eight equal districts, is a fair
representation. It is equal representation - until one
considers where seniority has placed Louisiana's eight
congressmen and two senators in the committee system.
The two senators, Allen J. Ellender and Russell B.
Long, have served a total of fifty-five years between
them. This long tenure in the Senate has entitled them
to chairmanships. Ellender heads the Appropriations
Committee and Long heads the Finance Committee. No
spending measure or taxing bill can get through the
Senate unless it passes through a committee chaired by
a senator from Louisiana. Senator Ellender supports
the "Conservative Coalition" 73% of the time and Long
supports the conservative position 60% of the time. (I
cite these "Conservative Coalition" Support Scores as
reported in the Congressional Quarterly for the 91st
Congress.) This support for the conservative position
is more than double that of the average Democratic
senator.

One of the eight congressmen, Representative F.
Edward Hebert, is chairman of the Armed Services Committee. Another, Representative Otto E. Passman,
sixth-ranking democratic member of the powerful
House Appropriations Committee, is chairman of the
Foreign Operations Subcommittee, through which
foreign aid bills must pass. A third, Representative
John Rarick, is a subcommittee chairman of the Agriculture Committee, even though he was stripped of
two years of seniority in 1969 for support of George
Wallace for President in 1968. A fourth, Representative Hale Boggs, rose to second-ranking majority member of the powerful Ways and Means Committee before
resigning this year to be Majority Leader of the House
of Representatives, a position not dependent on seniority.
A fifth, Representative Speedy 0. Long, is also a
member of the Armed Services Committee and chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Construction.
Of the remaining three congressmen, two have assignments to influential committees, Ways and Means and
Judiciary, but do not have the seniority required for
formal positions of leadership. Only the most junior
member of Louisiana's delegation, Representative
Patrick T. Caffery in his second term, draws a mundane
assignment on the Public Works Committee. These
rewards have come as the result of an average tenure
for the eight men of six consecutive terms.
It has not been the purpose of this discussion to document a plot by a group of people in Louisiana to take
over the United States Congress. Seniority and the committee system are no more amenable to the maneuvering of a conspiracy than they are to the power of the
voter armed with equal representation and majority
rule.

The Mass Media

Notes on the New Nostalgia

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------By RICHARD LEE
The gentle zephyrs of nostalgia now blowing through
the mass media don't carry me back far enough .
Certainly the present nostalgia is understandable.
It is a natural reaction to the "now" and "young" and
"revolutionary" and "futuristic" strummings and
thumpings in the media of a few years ago, none of
which could go on exponentially. It doubtless has a
desirably cooling and consoling effect on the psyches
which the media massage.
At the moment the most we seem able to turn back is
thirty or forty years. Nostalgia, of course, sticks close to
living memory - especially when it so thickly coats
products to be sold. At least nobody yet longs publicly
for the Golden Age of Greece, or for the flowering of
the Middle Ages, much less the American Revolution
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nearing its bicentenary.
Rather, the nostalgic themes in the mass media are
now taken mostly from the Americana of the 40's, 30's,
and 20's. Good rock music, like jazz before it, goes off
into purist cultivation for a discriminating few. The
swing sounds and simple love lyrics or just plain nonsense lyrics gradually return. Country music is renascent, too, and old time religion revives among the top
ten tunes and the Jesus freaks. (As a Christian, it always
puzzles me that a spooky Jesus is always near the center
of the nostalgia of the world; would some kind pagan
tell me why?)
The advertisements of some corporations mute their
emphasis on the new and experimental and remind us
how old and reliable they are in sepia tones and type
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with elaborate serifs inside curly borders. Movies recover luxury, sentimentality, and romance. Hair and
its imitations depart for wherever Aquarians go after
death, and Broadway puts the buck and wing back on
taps. Over-sized soup cans are no longer Pop art but
huge TV commercial stages for Busby Berkeley extravaganzas with waxy showgirls in star-spangled hot
pants. Buick commercials show the 1940 model driving
up to the 1971 model.
The midnight movies bring back Nelson Eddy and
Jeanette MacDonald musicals. Fashion magazines feature the "new look" of the 30's with midiskirts and
cloche hats. Illustrators return to Rockwellian rural
scenes. Radio stations rebroadcast old "Shadow" shows
when evil was all in the heart of man. TV talk shows are
depoliticized and reminisce with silent picture stars.
And on and on, backward.
So far the 50's are understandably untouched, but it
could be the logical end of it all. Save your Pat Boone
45's, pegged pants, crew cut wax, and chartreuse Ford
Crestliners. (For that matter, save your 60's stuff, too,
for what will need to be one of the oddest waves of nostalgia sometime in the early 80's.)
For some the present nostalgia is as campy as the 60's
nostalgia for W . C. Fields, Bogart, Dracula, Batman,
buckskins, beards, boots, and barefeet. Some of the present nostalgia is cousin to all the garden nostalgia of
the hippies and Consciousness III's. For some it is a
sweetened touch of death and some very sodden Weltschmerz. For some it is a little escape to forget where we
really are in time and evil. For some it is just another
job, the lucrative business of exploiting sentimentality.
For some it is hope, a recovery of archetypes, and a
searching for roots in the past.
Nostalgia, of course, is a highly selective return to
the past - the memory blindered by nostalgia sees only
a part of it. Such a past, like Roquefort, has improved
with age because much of it has decayed. I have just
come away from some of the new nostalgia, a transitionally rocked up but still recognizable recording of
"One Meat Ball." An older man with me remarked
about the pleasant memories of a happier past that the
song stirred in him! A student, yet in her teens, reminded him that the origin of the song was real hunger
in the great Depression. I suppose if you are a student
and have had that Depression thrown up to you often
enough as one greater than your own depressions, you
do some serious study of it.
I work on the edges of a university, and it's my good
luck to look over the shoulders of scholars whose vocation it is to "think backward," to penetrate our past as
wholly, honestly, and as imaginatively as they can. I
note the best of them have the gift to imagine that
which is familiar to us as it must have seemed to men
when it was new. And sometimes there follows from this
painstaking study a "revival" of interest in this or that
historical figure (often admittedly at the centenaries of
his birth or death). Or a "nco-orthodoxy" of this or that
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body of thought springs up. Here the past is probed
and consulted in order to face the future afresh. Not so,
I think, with nostalgia.
At least it appears to me that nostalgia often sharpens
the personal experience of historical change which it
hopes to soften. At its deepest levels, beyond faddishness, nostalgia may paradoxically intensify historical
change itself. The nostalgia which underlies much zeal
for progress has been noted often enough. The wildest
utopias, upon examination, look suspiciously like the
womb, and even modest reform proposals these days
sound like longings for the good old days when only
God could end the world. What is less widely noted is
that those who turn to nostalgia to ward off the tumult
of the present can also end up intensifying the change
they deplore. Most efforts to "rescue the past" concretely would now require changes so vast the mind boggles
to think of them. A fuller view of history than nostalgia
allows reminds us that restorations are also revolutions.

A Remedial Whimsy
The present nostalgia in the mass media, like any
other mood the media capture and exploit, will pass,
hastened away by the very media which will overexpose
it and the mediators themselves who will become bored
with it. Which brings me to the reason why I mused
earlier than the present nostalgia doesn't take me back
far enough.
David Riesman pointed up the formative influences
of the mass media on the increasing numbers of "otherdirected" men in American society nearly twenty years
ago. McLuhan, Lifton, Ellul and others since have done
no better than embroider his point that the media have
largely unreflected and undeflected influences toward
the massing of popular consciousness. To be perfectly
whimsical, my idea of a full, cleansing gale of nostalgia
would therefore be one which took us back to a time
when none of us were massaged, heated or cooled, by
the vast network of media at all.
It would be terrifying at first. We should need to
talk to one another and touch as neighbors. We should
need to develop our personal and regional and ethnic
talents for entertaining and instructing one another.
We might even go outdoors and discover what remains
of nature to befriend it. We might read (migosh!) books
we really care about. We should have to support and
respect and encourage our own theatres, singers, artists, musicians, poets, and story-tellers. We should
have to think and act and feel again and not merely
passively pick up signals. We should need to teach our
children how to nurture and husband the world rather
than to buy and consume it so plasticly. We should need
to teach ourselves once again our own unmediated responses to life.
This may be no more desirable than our present pass.
But to each his own nostalgia. Even if it is for me toward a world I never knew.
The Cresset

Books of the Month

The Future of Buddhism
BUDDHISM IN TRANSITION. By Donald
K. Swearer. Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1970 . $2.65 .
Much ink has been spilt in recent years in
discussing the question of the relationship of
religion and culture. Quite obviously, religion
exists within and as a part of culture, but in
some measure it also lives in tension with
culture. With its normative symbols, religion
takes a critical stance over against the culture in which it lives ; yet, at the same time
changes within the culture force religion itself to change or to become irrelevant and
insignificant. This is the issue that is explored
in Buddhism in Transition .
The process of cultural and religious change
is one with which we in the West are intimately acquainted. Western culture and , with
it, western consciousness has undergone a
process of radical reshaping in the past several centuries. This change continues at an everaccelerating pace. Western man finds it increasing difficult to hold onto his former view
of this world as one which is ruled , both in
nature and history , by a supreme and benevolent God .
The collapse of this religious world view
and the difficulty of finding a satisfactory
substitute continues to occupy the attention
of scholars in a wide variety of disciplines .
They chronicle in great detail the process of
this shift in consciousness. They invent powerful ways of describing the condition of the
modern man who feels himself caught in these
rushing waves of change. They talk of "the
contemporary crisis in religious consciousness;" they talk of a protean life-style, one
marked by a series of fundamental shifts in
loyalty and commitment; they talk of the "secular spirit," of the loss of transcendence and
the new search for transcendence.
Western Christian theologians have taken
up the challenge with great gusto and are
pouring out a steady stream of books and articles which attempt a restatement and reinterpretation of the Christian faith. Some of
these statements seem very tenuously related
to the classical formulations of the faith , and
thus only serve to illustrate further how deeply we are convinced that cultural change requires religious adaptation if our religious
commitment is to have fundamental significance for our life in this new age.
This process of cui tural and religious
change is now a world-wide phenomenon,
pressing itself upon people in every region
where science and technology have come to
offer their most ambiguous blessings. Not
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only does the development of technology imply a radical change in the everyday patterns
of practical living, but it forces new ways of
experiencing and new ways of formulating
our understanding of the world, the nature of
man , and the meaning of human existence.
These pressures of modernity have, in recent decades , made themselves keenly felt in
the Theravada Buddhist countries of Southeast Asia. What will be the role of Buddhism
in the process of change in these countries?
It is to this question that Donald Swearer
addresses himself in Buddhism in Transition .
The author, a professor of religion at Swarthmore College, brings his considerable knowledge of Buddhism and his recent experience
of a year of study and travel in these Buddhist
countries to a thoughtful consideration of
the future of Buddhism . He draws some rather
positive conclusions. He believes that Buddhism will play a strong and creative role in
this changing culture, and, what is more, he
is convinced that Buddhism will play a significant role also in shaping "the coming
world civilization(s)." (p. 16.)
One with at least a minimal understanding
of the fundamentals of Buddhist thought
might initially register a slight surprise at
Swearer's conclusions. How can Buddhism, a
religion which western scholars have for so
long regarded as a "life and world-denying"
approach to life, possibly become actively
and positively involved in the processes of
improving man's earthly and temporal situation? Is not Buddhism an advocate of "detachment" from the world? Does not Buddhism find i~ material earthly enjoyment the
greatest of temptations, the greatest enemy of
true human fulfillment? Do not the lures of
the good life invite men to craving (tanha) ,
that desperate clinging to impermanence as
though by our clinging we could make it
permanent and as though it would in the end
satisfy man's deepest longings?
Is it not the higher wisdom to remain aloof
from the struggle for material and sensory
satisfactions in the knowledge that the world
is ultimately incapable of undergoing significant improvement? Does not the present effort
to enhance the physical conditions of life only
add to man's delusions and prevent him from
realizing that suffering and unsatisfactoriness
(dukkha) are the abiding and all-pervading
characteristics of this world? Does not the
lure of the "good life" only militate against
the salvation of men and lead them to even
deeper frustrations and unfulfilledness, not
to speak of lower and less fortunate rebirths?
Does not the very existence of Buddhist mon-

astic communities in these countries hold up
the ideal of withdrawal from worldly concerns
and ambitions? How can such a religion be
expected to participate in a creative and po~i
tive way in the present reshaping of culture?
As author Donald Swearer shows us so very
well, Buddhism has not been unambiguously
negative in its view of ordinary earthly existence. It has been critical of man's "natural"
way of living in this world and has shown him
the Path to transcend this state, but it is
hardly accurate to describe the Buddhist way
as a "life and world-denying" approach to
life.

Nirvana and Nationalism
It should be remembered that from the very
beginning of Buddhism there was considerable emphasis upon teaching the Path to the
laity, not so that they would leave the life of
the householder and withdraw to the forest ,
but to enable them to cultivate those virtues
and that wisdom which would enable them to
progress toward the goal of perfection and,
thus , a serene and happy life, in some sense,
being "in the world but not of the world."
Laymen were taught to honor and serve parents, elders and rulers, to love their children
and neighbors, and to cultivate the wellbeing of the entire community of man.

As Swearer points out, Buddhist involvement in the world is well illustrated by the
example of the great Indian Buddhist king.
Asoka (3rd c. B.C.). The Buddha's teaching
about compassion for all beings led Asoka to
cease his warring ways and to dedicate his
rule to the establishment of hospitals and
other centers of mercy for both men and animals. Buddhist social concern during the reign
of Asoka is extended still further in later
legends; he is seen as a kind of sacred king,
the universal ruler (cakkravattin ). the one
"who governs through his personal merit for
the well-being and security of the individual
and society." (p. 37) He is the one who must
order the society according to eternal truth
(dharma), so that people may have the necessary conditions in which to pursue the spiritual and moral ideals of the Buddhist Path .
To that end the king has a most intimate
connection with the order of monks (sangha) .
He is charged with their support and their
safety, and they , in turn, bless and sanction
his kingship. It is this kind of social and
political model which became and remained
a part of Theravada Buddhism's outlook as
it expanded to Ceylon and then into Southeast Asia. Thus, the model for "this-worldly"
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involvement in Buddhism is an old and honored one and has lived side by side with those
other Buddhist ideals of detachment and the
pursuit of an other-worldly Nirvana.
From recent history , Swearer calls our
attention to the feeling which is strong in
Southeast Asian countries, that Buddhism
and nationhood are intimately related. He
discusses at some length the case of U Nu,
former prime minister of Burma. "U Nu conceived of Buddhism as providing the basic
answer to Burma's many post-independence
problems." (p. 41) He espoused a kind of
Buddhist socialism and felt that Buddhism
would be able to help the people to overcome their self-acquisitive nature in the interest of the welfare of all. While some have
seen U Nu as an opportunist in this respect ,
Swearer is convincing in presenting him as
one who was both devout and creative in relating the Buddhist tradition to modernity.
In a similar vein , Swearer presents the
cases of the great Sinhalese champion of independence for Ceylon, S.W .R.D. Bandaranaike, and that of Prince Norodom Sihanouk
in Cambodia, each of whom worked and
dreamed for the future of his country in the
interest of independent nationhood and in the
interest of the strengthening of Buddhism .
The role of Vietnamese monks in the demise
of the Diem regime serves as still another
example of Buddhism's part in the shaping of
Southeast Asia's future.
Particularly interesting for giving the read-

er a feel for the role of Buddhists in Thailand
is the author's chapter, "Two Portraits of
Thai Buddhism." Swearer discusses two
monks , Phra Maha Sila and Buddhadasa
Bhikkhu. In the former portrait we begin to
get a glimpse of the relation of the order of
monks to social development. Phra Maha
Sila is a monk and an educator. Many of the
monks who work with him are involved in
such things as counseling agencies, community centers, hospitals, schools, free hotels ,
charity employment agencies and agricultural
uplift programs.
Buddhadasa, on the other hand , illustrates
Buddhism's attempt to reinterpret its own
tradition in the light of the contemporary
situation. He emphasizes that the Buddhist
pursuit of redemption does not demand a
literal withdrawal from worldly involvements .
He defines redemption (presumably Nirvana)
in strongly "this-worldly" terms as the movement "from one mode of existence and rebirth
into a new one, release from suffering and sin
and the experience of a new freedom and
peace . ... " (p. 108) Samsara becomes, for
Buddhadasa, a pointing toward a new state,
one in which man is "freed from preoccupation with the self." (p. 109) He is, in Swearer's
terms , a "demythologizer" and a brilliant
interpreter, who has also taken some important first steps in an attempt to begin a constructive dialogue with Christianity.
In all of this , Swearer is not interested in
watching Buddhism simply capitulate to the

tide of change. He continues to s.e arch for
signs that, while participating in change and
undergoing change itself, Buddhism must
maintain that "creative tension" with culture
which is the true and necessary role of any
religion.
Can Buddhism make any difference in the
West? Can it contribute anything at all to
Christian ways of thinking? Swearer introduces the reader to a number of western
thinkers who answer those questions in the
affirmative. Roman Catholics, Thomas Merton and Dom Aelard Graham , and free lance
author, Alan Watts, are among those who believe Buddhism can significantly enrich our
lives in the West. The growing interest of
college students in America may be another
indication that the western mind can find
meaning in Buddhist thought and practice.
Perhaps it is too early to know whether this
youthful exploration of Buddhism will be
more than ephemeral, but there can be no
doubt that, in a great many instances , it is a
genuine quest for meaning.
With this relatively brief volume, Donald
Swearer has performed a real service, especially for the non-specialist reader. Southeast Asia has been on our minds for a long
time and it promises to remain in the spotlight
for some time to come. Buddhism in Transition can be a significant help in understanding.

EDGAR P. SENNE

Claiming the Media for the Fulfillment of Man
TELEVISION - RADIO - FILM FOR
CHURCHMEN. Volume II in the Series :
Communication for Churchmen. Edited by
B. F. Jackson, Jr. Nashville: Abingdon Press ,
c. 1969. $6 .50 .
This is volume two in the series Communication for Churchmen, edited by B. F. Jackson, Jr., whose regular job calls for a pretty
big letterhead : Executive Director of Communication Processes and Learning Resources, Division of the Local Church, United
Methodist Board of Education. The series
has the admirable aim of giving Christians
"a better understanding of communication
and learning so that these processes may be
employed to greater advantage in the work of
the church ." The first volume, Communication - Learning for Churchmen (reviewed
in this journal , February , 1970). discussed
basic elements of communication and learning theory; the present volume gets down to
specific application.
Peter A. H . Meggs, Director of Communications for the Anglican Church in Canada,
contributes the essay on "Television and the
Church"; Everett C. Parker, Director of Communication for the United Church of Christ,
does the same for radio; and John M. Culkin,
S. J., Director of the Center for Communica-
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tions , Fordham University, writes on film .
Meggs and Parker both take a strongly institutional approach to their subjects, preferring to discuss the corporate and institutional aspects of churchly relations with radio
and television - reflecting, no doubt, their
occupational concerns. Meggs begins by reproducing a stinging bit of criticism from a
columist in the Toronto Star Weekly Magazine:
Aside from these [devotions at sign-on
and televised services) there is nothing.
Organized religion has left us to get our
notions of moral anguish from newscasts, our best understanding of courage
from Czech citizens and the mothers of
black school children in New Orleans,
our best examples of passionate selflessness from the secretaries-general of the
U .N., our clearest images of grace in pain
from the widows of assassins' victims and
our ideas of ethical vigor from Dr. Spock.
As for The Word itself. . . .well , here is
Billy Graham, with $1,000 ,000 to spend
.. . .( 13)
If Meggs intended this as an intimation of his
agenda, as I think he has , then he has left us
comfortless; the problem remains to plague
communicating churchmen. To be sure,

Meggs wants to do more than merely defend
the work of his own denomination in Canada.
He is willing to ask whether a Billy Graham
rally is "a valid expression of the gospel on
television ," and he wants to ask : " Is theology
(a word about God) present in a secular newscast, a documentary , or a situation comedy?"
With commendable honesty , he admits his
bias: "denominational broadcasting is as
wasteful and self-defeating as denominationalism itself in our time." But, taking Simon
Phipps (of Coventry fame) as his theological
mentor, Meggs can do little more than to poke
(deserved) fun at churchly attempts to take
God into his own world , and to advocate programs which point to a God already present
in the world , busily "making all things new."
There is a rather competent - and refreshingly non-McLuhanesque - survey of
the nature of television as a medium and as a
social force. So, breathes there a c~urchman
communicator with soul so print-oriented
that he digs not the videot-box, let him Meggs
it up a bit here.
After a rather thorough and illuminating
survey of the good and bad things churches
have done on TV (in the course of which survey he admits that he is not ready to join
those who would banish telecasts of the
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church's liturgy). Meggs proposes "New Involvement with Television" - principally
church-sponsored evaluation of existing programming and litigation over license renewal
applications from flagrant violators of the
public interest (a Ia the UCC vs. WLBT in
1964). Such involvement of Christians in
media criticism is justified by the following :
If God cannot be contained in the church
building box, he can no more be confined to what we have been content to
call religious programming. He is the
God of all creation, including secular
television programming. (79)
To be sure! But still undone is the task of
showing what tqat might mean, of showing
how God "Gods-it" over secular programs, of
suggesting what in the world God may be up
to on Mannix or Star Trek or "with God all
Missions are Possible." Until Meggs. or someone else, can show what God is in fact doing
in the media, perorations like this one are
less than helpful:
God really was standing waist-deep in
the mass media after all. summoning us
to full participation with him in claiming
the media for the fulfillment of man.
(p. 92)
Everett C . Parker does us the service of
showing that radio , far from being moribund,
has become a whole new kind of communications force. People listen to radio differently
than they did prior to the advent of television ;
radio's role is new , its audience is young and
on-the-move, and it has a flexibility and "presence" that TV simply cannot match. The
churchman's role here is to "aid and abet," by
helping to focus concern on the ethical/ social

issues of our time (also and especially those
posed by the broadcast industry itself). And
the goal is to help " the public reassert its
authority over broadcasting so as to protect
the freedom of speech of the citizen and his
right of access to the broadcast media." (p.
150 ) Parker is himself a veteran of such action. and his insider's report on the UCC/
WLBT affair is one of the more interesting
portions of the book.
In his survey of developments in religious
radio programming. Parker curiously has
little to say about The Lutheran Hour - in
spite of that program's status as one of the
earliest and best examples of the use of radio
for Christian proclamation. But one such comment is a real prize, for it points to the virtue
of the Hour that was , while implying the
crisis of the Hour that now is:
The origins of The Lutheran Hour, for
example, can be traced to a realization
on the part of the Lutheran Laymen's
League that its programs had to be produced specifically for radio . (154)
Bravo! Trouble is. radio in 1971 is a different
animal than she was in the '30's!
John M. Culkin contributes an essay that
is far and away the prize of the volume. \Vith
patience, wit, and conviction, the Jesuit disciple of McLuhan makes the case for the use of
contemporary cinema by the churches as
they go about the business of teaching. "It is
the Alfies," he says, "which have to a degree
become the teaching films" of today. And a
great chunk of his essay shows "how-to-do-it,"
using La Strada as the example.
The goals he seeks to meet are not so much
specifically Christian communication as

rather aid in tuning in on the humanum in cinema as in literature - so that men
can "grow beyond what Piaget calls the ' I
my. me' world of childhood to the freedom of
maturity." (207) And. since "all the data isn't
in on what it means to be a complete human
being" (217). Culkin urges the churchman to
tune in on the vast teaching machine of contemporary cinema for some indications of
what that data includes.
Of extreme value for the DCE on the prowl
for materials is the example of "Perspectives
on War: A Teaching Unit of Films," an example of the kind of work being done under Culkin 's direction at Fordham. A variety of short
films are "programmed" to focus the issues in
the unit, complete with commentary on the
films and discussion-starters. A series of
appendices lists film sources . children 's films .
and an extensive bibliography both on cinema
and on media in general.
What the book says about the media is careful. thorough , and terribly important, and
must be helpful to "the churchman." But. like
its predecessor, it fails to discharge the theologian's task. Parker's monition to potential
radio broadcasters should be turned around
and used of churchly media-tors:
Any religious spokesman who aspires to
use radio successfully must undergo the
discipline of becoming as much a professional in broadcasting as he is in religion. (171)
Unfortunately. this volume fails to add to the
still meager evidence that the churches' media
officers have the requisite professionalism
in theology.
DAVID G. TRUEMPER

A Reader to Bring Talkers out of Watchers
HOW TO TALK BACK TO YOUR TELEVISION SET. By Nicholas Johnson . Boston : Little, Brown and Company . 1969.
$5 .75 .
The battle of television goes on. But who
a re the combatants? Is it Agnew and company
versus Brinkley and cohorts? The videots versus the eggheads? Cartoon-addicts versus
Sesame Street devotees? Private enterprise
(network power structures) versus the public
interest (but how much of the public is really
in teres ted?)?
Federal Communications Commission
member Nicholas Johnson thinks the major
battle is the last-named . between the "fat
cat" network boards and the public interest.
represented by the understaffed and underfunded FCC . And in this collection of essays
written since 1967 . he makes a pretty strongcase for the weak side. seeking to document
his contention that the " public interest" is
being violated and corrupted by private
enterprise in the persons of broadcast owners
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and stockholders.
The most significant essay, "The Media
Barons and the Public Interest," introduces
the reader to the problem of ownership of
mass media operations, and to the repeatedly
stymied efforts of the FCC to guard the public
interest. In effect, Johnson claims , the FCC
must do its job on the basis of an archaic charter (the 1934 Communications Act). with an
inadequate staff and budget, and in the face
of opposition not onl y from a powerful broadcasting lobby but also from a Congress perhaps one-third of whose members themselves
have financial interests in broadcasting operations.
Another highly significant and controversial issue raised several times by Johnson is
that of censorship. Where would regulation
in the public interest become governmental
censorship? Can a regulatory agency like the
FCC be strengthened without trampling on
the freedom of speech and press? Johnson certainl y wants a stronger FCC. and he thinks
that censorship can be avoided with the help

of a citizens' watchdog commission . Trouble
is, nobody has yet fig-ured out how to make
such a commission sufficiently prestigious
that it can be effective!
Johnson urges other kinds of " talk-back."
from the forced realig-nment of the industry,
to public access to the airwaves . to forced
decentralization of programming control. to
citizen involvement in hearings for license
renewals. This latter item deserves special
mention ; a station 's license must be renewed
every three years. and the FCC must hear
citizens' comments about how well the station
has served the public interest in the preceding triennium . "Keep those cards and
letters coming- in . .
There are more fruitful ways of talking
back to your television set than throwing an
empty beer bottle at the tube. Johnson's book
is one good source of suggestions . So read
it - and talk back!
DAVID G . TRUEMPER

23

Visual Arts Exhibition
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------ByRICHARD H.W. BRAUER

LEFT: Albrecht Duerer, THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST, 1510.
Woodcut, 15 3/ 8" x 11 ". Last of eleven woodcuts published in 1511 and called The Large Passion.
National Gallery of Art, Rosenwald Collection.

"In reality it fuses the Resurrection with the Ascension ....
According to a scheme developed in Italy, but contrary to the Northern tradition
to which Duerer adhered in his other prints of the resurrection,
Christ is not represented standing on the ground or on the lid of the sarcophagus,
much less in the very act of stepping out of the tomb;
He is miraculously suspended above the grave ....
The figure is set out against a 'neutral' background bordered by a band
of radiant clouds which cuts into the gloom of nocturnal scenery."

Erwin Panofsky
Life and Art of Albrecht Duerer

ABOVE: Abraham Rattner , THE LAST JUDGMENT, 1953-1956. Oil on canvas, three panels, 8' x 12'. The Downtown Gallery. Photograph by
Geoffrey Clements .

"The nightmare of Hiroshima-Nagasaki got me started - but the war was over no, the war was not over - no, the war j·s not over.
Maybe it's the way of civilization to have the air filled with torment, anxieties, fears, doubts.
Me and mine. You and yours. Always more, more, more.
Do yon have to dominate? Do you have to be the largest, the greatest, the biggest,
the best? Always on and on- to the inevitable violence, collision, war, the sinister end.
Haunted by a nightmare, the vision stares at my silence.
The painting became the interpretation of the final reality of the atom,
the form and the color became the apocalyptic metaphors."

A braham Rattner
Quoted by Frank Getlein
An Exhibition Booklet of The American Federation of Arts

The Theatre

Revivals Continued
----------------------------------------------------------------------------By WALTER SORELL

Last month I reported on several revivals, and it
seems that this season is distinguishing itself as a season
of classic and semi-classic plays.
Claire Bloom added to her fine characterization of
Nora in The Doll:r House an engrossing realization of
Hedda in Hedda Gabler. Last June in London I saw
Ingmar Bergman's cinematic stage version of the latter
play with Maggie Smith as Hedda, and it was an unforgettable experience. The production, however, was
far more Bergman's concept of Hedda than Ibsen's.
Patrick Garland's direction of Miss Bloom as Hedda
brought forth a production which could have been staged
by Ibsen himself. Miss Bloom creates this highly neurotic and frigid woman with Ibsenesque clarity; the
action of the play progresses with cold logic but beneath
it is Hedda's underlying motivation of finding an emotional meaning in life. The highlight of her performance came with the burning of Lovborg's manuscript.
With each gesture she showed her desperate disdain
for life and hope, but equally as much her consuming
jealousy, the daimon driving her toward self-destruction.
Moliere's gentle comedy of human foibles , The
School for Wives, received an enchanting rendering at
the Phoenix Theater. The text was superbly translated
by Richard Wilbur, and Stephen Porter directed the
play with a superb cast. Porter has a way of giving
Moliere the necessary touch of stylization without
making us too much aware of the play as period piece.
It stands and falls with the actor playing Arnolphe,
and Brian Bedford displays rare understanding for
Moliere. As Arnolphe, Bedford knows how to make a
fool, who becomes the victim of his own scheming,
appear utterly human. Arnolphe is constantly used as
the confidant of his rival in love; this makes the part
of Arnolphe a most demanding one, for the actor must
let us know Arnolphe's feelings while they must be
hidden from the rival. Bedford pulls it off delightfully . When The School for Wives was first produced,
Moliere was attacked for having questioned the law
that gave guardians absolute authority over minors;
it only goeli to show that even so urbane a playwright
as Moliere, who only wanted to entertain, can get into
trouble.
The theme of hope deferred is as old as the first man
who began to grope for the meaning of human life. The
realization that God may have forgotten man and man's
plea to be recognized as the human being he is are
dramatized in Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot. The
characters are essentially symbolic reincarnations of
Job, and their afflictions are indeterminately hidden
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in living itself. The succession of little deaths creates
the feeling of futility which creates the feeling of boredom which creates the need for faith which creates the
fortitude with which twentieth century Job hangs on,
waiting without hope.
Beckett's play has become a semi-classic by now after
only sixteen years in existence. This proves, if nothing
else, how fast we move nowhere. Alan Schneider gave
this dramatization of life as a tragicomic vaudeville
act the right tone of gallows humor, and there is in it
the right feeling for the huge word symphony of tantalizing gibberish with its frightful meaning. Waiting for
Godot has become alive again in the Sheridan Square
Playhouse.
Peter Brook's staging of A Midsummer Night :r Dream
is a lightyear away from any previous version of the
play, particularly those versions evoking the spirit of
Mendelssohn's music. I still remember the celebrated
stage version done by Max Reinhardt when I was quite
young, and I delighted with Reinhardt in the fact that
the grass he used was real grass the the trees real trees.
Brook asked his stage designer to create a theatrical
space in which everything should be functional so that
Brook could celebrate pure theatre, or rather theatricality.
He chose fireman's ladders instead of trees; the love
juice is dispensed from a silver plate spinning on a
juggler's stick; and a huge scarlet ostrich feather makes
up the bed which Titania shares with Bottom. Oberon
swings on a trapeze; Puck hangs on ropes and runs on
stilts; and Bottom is transformed far more into a clown
than an ass.
A circus atmosphere in a commedia dell'arte style
forces the actors to be acrobats and singers. There is an
uninterrupted mingling of styles and ideas, and roles
are doubled to unify all the lovers in a common dream .
Illusions are enhanced by demystifying conventional
concepts, and mockery mixes with surprise. All this
results in the most imaginative and poetic Dream whose
totality is as overwhelming as each of its parts.
Not a single word of the Shakespearean text is omitted or tampered with. Every line, spoken with the lilt
of its most lyric value , comes across beautifully. The
nonsensical parts of the mixed-up lovers suddenly make
sense on that brightly lit stage and in a clinical atmosphere of circus tricks. "The lunatic, the lover, and the
poet" are unified in the acrobat. And the acrobat is in
fact a stage magician who lets us see all his tricks. This
Dream creates the magic of true make-believe. If this is
avant-garde theatre - I am all for it.
The Cresset

Editor-At-Large

By .IOHN STIIIETELMEIEII

Reflections of a Loyal Oppositionist
I don't know why anybody should be interested in my
views on the present turmoil within The Lutheran
Church - Missouri Synod, but apparently there are
those who are. So here , for whatever it may be worth ,
is the way my thinking runs.
The Missouri Synod - any church body for that
matter - as an institution falls within what Lutheran
theologians have called the Kingdom of the Left Hand .
It is a body politic with instruments and agencies not
radically different from a government or a labor union
or the United States Chamber of Commerce. Through
these institutions and agencies it makes its decisions.
That means that there is a political process at work,
however much we may prefer to ignore it and ascribe
our corporate decisions to the secret work of the Holy
Spirit. (I am not denying that the Spirit may, indeed,
motivate particular decisions , but He does so through
the very human agency of politics, understood as a
human invention for expediting the making of decisions .)
As in all political bodies, there are parties within The
Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod, corresponding very
roughly to Right, Left, and Center. All of them claim to
be rooted firmly in the Holy Scriptures and the Lutheran Confessions - and the sincerity of this claim may
be readily granted. The operative fact is that they understand the Scriptures and the Confessions differently,
and no amount of papering over can conceal those differences. So profound are these differences that it is
difficult for any one of us to define the stance of those
with whom he differs without reaching for some sort of
invidious cliche. Thus Rightist, conservative, and fundamentalist have come to be synonymous in the vocabulary of some of us, while Leftist, liberal , and modernist have come to be synonymous to others of u s.
For something like 25 years prior to 1969, The Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod was controlled by a colaition of Liberals and Moderates under the presidencies
of two great and widely-respected Moderates, Dr. John
W. Behnken and Dr. Oliver R. Harms. Neither man had
any great sympathy for the Liberal theological position, but both apparently felt attracted to the open ,
live-and-let-live churchmanship of the Liberal party.
I remember Dr. Behnken coming to Valparaiso and
scolding those of us who talked about the age of the
earth in terms of billions rather than thousands of
years - and then having lunch with us in a spirit of
good-fellowship. And I admired him for his capacity
to switch roles so completely from that of the Grand
Inquisitor, which was assigned to him by the Synodical
constitution and which he did not hesitate to play, to
that of the kindly and genial reverend father in God
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who seldom tried to hurry the converting and enlightening work of the Holy Spirit.
These years of Liberal ascendancy ended suddenly
and decisively at the Synodical convention in Denver
in the summer of 1969. Against all precedent, a Moderate incumbent president who was still in the vigor of
his sixties was turned out of office and a young Conservative was elected to succeed him. So much is, I believe,
factual. What follows is my own interpretation of events.
Having come to power, the Conservative party did
what the Liberals had done a generation before. They
consolidated their power and began to divide the spoils.
(If anyone is offended by these images from the secular
political world , I would suggest that it is just because
we fail to recognize the similarity of operations in all
human institutions that we handle transfers of power
so badly within the church.) The national laymen's association had been taken over even before the Denver
convention. After that convention the publications became a prime target. Once they had been taken over or
neutralized, the time had come for the big move against Concordia Seminary.
I share with my fellow Liberals a feeling of resentment
that what our party might justifiably consider its best
gift to the church - the Seminary in its present form should now be under attack from men who, we suspect,
have no idea of the amount of labor and dedication that
went into the building of that place. But in our more
thoughtful moments, we realize that this move is consistant with the conscious policy of the Conservatives
and with what a great many Moderates, possibly unwittingly, voted for when they brought the present Synodical administration to office.
What I do not share with my fellow Liberals is the
feeling that there is anything evil or underhanded in
the move against the Seminary. I expect the Conservatives to act as conservatives; indeed I would feel that
they had deceived the church if they did not. Our task
as Liberals, forming a loyal opposition, is not, therefore,
to condemn them, but to oppose them.
Our task as Liberals is a task of churchmanship, which
is to say, of politics. If we truly believe that our policies are in the best interest of the church and of those
larger purposes which the church serves, it is our responsibility to regain power. And the way to do that is
to re-establish the coalition between Liberals and Moderates which for so long, as I think, served the church
well and which, in my judgment, foundered at Denver
because we Liberals were either unwilling or unable to
address ourselves to the concerns of our Moderate
brethren.
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The Pilgrim
"All the tmmbets sounded (or him on the other side"
PILGRIM's PROGRESS

Another ''End of Innocence "
By JOHN KRETZMANN

"Social revolutions are a compromise between utopia and historical
reality.
Leszek Kolakowski
All Power to the Imagination .

Young Peoples' Slogan

In my February column on this page I attempted to
outline some of the causes of what appears to be a rather
widespread disillusionment with colleges and universities, and to point to some possible remedies for this
state of affairs. Since the basic argument seemed quite
clear to me, I was surprised to note my father's decision in his March column to print a vigorous rebuttal
-shattering the well-plotted sequence of our exchanges.
But boggled was my mind quadruply when I discovered that the substance of his "rebuttal" was based
upon approving quotations from the very column he
purported to be ripping to shreds. Ah, Dr. Freud, is
there some explanation for this basic drive which sets
fathers in eternal rebellion against their sons?
At any rate, my father's decision has freed me to
open up a new line of inquiry here. I want to begin to
isolate what is possibly a central defect in the American
left, in all of its attempts to build sustained movements
for social change. The defect involves a curious vacillation in the collective psychology - in the mood - of
people seriously committed to social change. It is a kind
of "pendulum syndrome" which contributes directly to
the maintainance of systems of privilege and the status
quo in our society.
The poles between which the pendulum swings may
be variously described: a Christian might refer to them
as "faith" and "reason," a poet as "imagination" and
"reality," a Marxian scholar as "utopianism" and "rationalism."Yet no matter which set of terms one chooses to
deal with, it is clear that each pole carries with it a distinct
and comprehensive set of assumptions about the world
one lives in, investing that world with either frightening powers of limitation or infinite possibilities and
opportunities.
It is perhaps typical of single-minded America that
she has not been able to produce a sustained movement
for social change, one which would necessarily have its
foundation in the ambiguous and dialectical ground
which lies between these poles.
One need not look back into history too far to find
ample evidence of the pendulum syndrome. In his
controversial coda for the left, published in 1955, Les-
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lie Fiedler argued that An End to Innocence was a good
thing, that a left based upon foreign models and leadership, especially discredited models and leadership, was
fundamentally dishonest and irrelevant. The rug had
been pulled out from under the vision and the vision
disintegrated. But the deflation of Fiedler's version of
innocence led, in reaction, to the largely uncritical
acceptance of a Realpolitik world whose boundaries were
described by a simplistic Cold War reading of reality.
Disillusioned and frustrated, the left melted into the
pragmatic American mainstream.
Yet already a swing back to the opposite pole was
stirring in the wings. It was partly out of a frustration at
the restrictive nature of a timid realism that a "new"
left emerged . And we can begin now to see that the sixties were marked by the rebirth of a wide variety of forms
of innocence.
Certainly this was an innocence born of unbounded
good will, active imaginations, lofty intentions - and
an almost defiantly naive reading of political reality.
Wars would end when good people refused to fight in
them. Racism would disappear when good people eliminated their own prejudices. Ugly cities would be replaced by communities built with bright colors and
love. One could, in short, rebuild a society by rebuilding one's own life. That the vision , the imagination
of the sixties was fundamentally personalistic rather
than collective may help to explain both its widespread
attractiveness and its probable evanescence.
For now, as anyone listening to the messages from campuses and communities can report, a very different mood
is upon us. The pendulum swings back once again , as
innocence and imagination are buried under a kind of
sobering severity. That tender faith which held that
even politics was love has been smothered by the disturbing recognition that, in reality, even love is politics .
This new realism , this current version of an "end to
innocence," seems to have presented many of our most
sensitive young people with a collective emotional
crisis of truly frightening depths. They have perceived
the web of institutionalized inhumanity tightening
about us all , and the perception has driven some into a
stance of extreme privatism and despair. In a world
where politics was love, where were the limitations ?
But in a world where love is politics, where are the
possibilities? That, at the moment, is our dilemma.
Next month, perhaps, my father will lead into our
last topic - in which we will offer our separate hopes for
imagination, for faith, for new life, for the future of man.
The Cresset

